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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
One of the fundamental issues in 20
th
 century philosophy is of the nature of individual 
subjective experience. I seek to show how this “nature” is revealed and hidden by a 
historical process outlined in History of Madness by Michel Foucault. Foucault’s 
philosophical and anthropological engagement with the experience of madness in The 
Modern Age functions as a useful tool towards this end. The psychologisation and 
medicalization of madness in the 19
th
 century allowed for an endless discourse on 
madness. This in turn permitted the language of the mad to burst open from its silence, 
historically present since the Great Confinement. This language of madness expressed 
itself poetically and artistically, thus revealing the paradoxical essence of the nature of 
human subjectivity as well as the particularity of its expression in the Modern Period. 
This particularity is elucidated from a genealogical account of the births of subjectivity 
and objectivity. I proceed to use this genealogy in conjunction with the language of 
madness to posit a prescriptive theory for aesthetic engagement. The essay seeks to show 
how the aesthetic experience can aid in the affirmation of the individual’s modern 
subjective reality. Thusly, the “goal” of the essay is to reveal affirmation, i.e., amor fati, 
the love of fate.   
 
Keywords: Foucault, subjectivity, madness, aesthetics, genealogy, Nietzsche, Bataille  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Over the brief course of my career as an undergraduate I’ve come to learn a great 
deal about myself, and effectively create myself, through my study of philosophy. When I 
reflect upon the classes I’ve chosen to take, the papers I have written, and the books I 
bother to annotate, I’m able to glimpse a loose association of themes to which I am 
consistently drawn. This reflection has lent me the ability to view the shadows of my own 
will, and thusly I have been able to consciously apply this will to particular projects, 
however so slightly. Over the past three years I’ve noticed my rising interest in the 
affective and subjective growth of the individual and, to a lesser extent, the community. I 
am interested in how one might be able to experience one’s life, how that experience is 
shaped by the experience of others, and what one is capable of being within the context 
one is granted. How is it that one can lead a more meaningful human life, not in the sense 
of productivity, moral rectitude, or social utility but simply in one’s fundamental 
sensational/affective/subjective experience? It is not so much a question of living “the 
good life” so much as it is a question of “feeling alive.” Though I certainly understand 
the importance of questions on morality, such questions are tangential to my primary 
concern: how one experiences one’s life, what it might mean to be what one is, and how 
one might be able to robustly and vigorously embrace/affirm life.  
My introduction to the philosophy of Michel Foucault was in the spring of 2011. 
In his work, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, I read of a hidden guilt within each person’s 
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body, that is, an internalized repression of one’s sexual expression, thusly limiting a 
“fulfilled” sexual experience. I began to wonder how such limitations on a subject’s lived 
experiences could be manifested in ways other than sexuality. It was not shocking to find 
that Foucault, a man of great erudition and scholarship, had written on many 
manifestations of this issue. Combined with my ceaseless interest in the philosophy of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, this sparked my continual interest to write about the experiential, 
affective life, and a quest to find that which is “life-affirming.” I believe that Foucault, in 
his historical description/interpretation of that which is repressive and “life-denying,” 
provides the negative which may let me glimpse, however so slightly, the positive, i.e., 
the life-affirming. In other words, through engagement with Foucault’s text, I believed I 
would be able to extract answers, however so inadequate, to help tackle the questions 
outlined above. 
Since I have a particular fascination with the limits of subjective experience, the 
madmen trapped at the edge of society in Foucault’s earliest masterwork, History of 
Madness, seemed like a wonderful place to begin. History of Madness is an expansive 
book loaded with a wealth of different philosophical ideas and themes. The majority of 
the present essay functions as an exegesis of History of Madness. However, in an attempt 
to limit my focus, I concern myself largely with questions of human subjectivity as they 
arise in the later chapters. I’ve sought to use this book, and Foucault’s early philosophy, 
as well as the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and George Bataille, to make a case for 
a particular understanding of modern subjectivity, how that compares to human 
subjectivity generally, and what the possible implications of these findings might be.  
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Certainly, more general questions of human nature have concerned philosophers 
for centuries. Precisely what is “human nature?” What does it mean to be a human being? 
I have found these to be very difficult questions to which no one has yet provided any 
adequate responses. While general, universal answers might be impossible, and perhaps 
even tyrannical, it should not be assumed that there are not particular circumstances in 
which part of “the truth” is exposed. Foucault believed, and I think rightly so, that 
through a close study of madness, particularly its development in The Classical Age and 
through the 19th century, one could give some answers to questions of subjectivity, at 
least as they pertains to the modern human being.  
I believe that much of this can be answered by “the objectification of liberty.” 
Foucault uses this phrase to refer to the concept of liberty as it has been perceived from 
The Classical Age onward. To “objectify” means to make an object, to make definite, to 
make understandable and knowable. On such a definition “the objectification of liberty” 
seems like a strange and paradoxical concept. Liberty, meaning the allowance of 
freedom, appears as something essentially nonessential. In other words, there is not a 
“somethingness” to liberty. How might one then decide what freedom is? Though it 
would seem impossible, this did not stop the “objectification” of the concept in The 
Classical Age. With the advancement of liberalism in The Enlightenment, liberty began 
to be perceived as having particular moral qualities.   
A walk down this line of reasoning leads us to Foucault’s History of Madness. 
According to Foucault, the mad in the societies of 17
th
 and 18
th
 century Europe were 
considered responsible for exercising their liberty to its extreme. There were no rules to 
madness; it functioned according to its own whims. In being so completely indulgent and 
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unreasonable, madness had exercised its liberty to the point at which “rational” decisions 
were no longer made, though the truth of this analysis will be considered in the coming 
chapters.  Thusly, in being so free, the mad were determined/enslaved by basic, irrational 
drives. In fact, during the Classical Age the mad were literally in chains, due to The Great 
Confinement, in which the mad, the criminals, and the beggars were all thrown into 
confinement cells together, silenced to the outside world.  Madness, in its literal and 
figurative chains, showed the bounds of liberty, and thusly revealed the chains of 
“normalized/rational” liberty. If society put restrictions and rules on freedom, then this is 
not radical/true freedom, but rather limited freedom. Limited freedom seems contrary to 
the “nature” of freedom, as freedom is itself limitless, i.e., free.  To objectify liberty is to 
define the infinite/indefinable, an impossible task that can do no more than alienate 
liberty from itself.  One might then conclude that in order to live in civil society we must 
limit our own freedom and therefore overcome the truth of our nature. 
But what exactly is the truth of our nature? As Foucault continues his narration of 
the history of madness, society progresses into the 19th century and the mad were freed 
from the literal chains of The Great Confinement and put into asylums; here they were to 
receive more specific care and specialized treatment. Physicians and psychologists had 
more control over the happenings of the mad and were able to advance the science on 
mental illness. Foucault hints that this is because the mad were no longer silenced, though 
this is only in a literal sense of the word. Ideas regarding silence, voice, and language will 
be expounded upon in later chapters. 
Perhaps the most astounding discovery/creation of Foucault’s history is that the 
madness of the mad reflected nothing other than the madness in us all. The 
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psychologisation and medicalization of madness in the 19th century allowed for an 
endless discourse on madness. Thusly, the mad were once more given the chance to tell 
their story, and in doing so they revealed an underlying subjectivity hidden, for lack of a 
better word, in “human nature.” This in turn permitted the language of the mad to burst 
open from its silence, historically present since The Great Confinement. This language of 
madness expressed itself poetically and artistically in innumerable forms with endless 
chatter. Foucault concludes that there is a deep-seated unreason that underlies all reason. 
The non-objectivity and the subjectivity at root in the human being, thusly reveal the 
paradoxical essence of human subjectivity as well as the particularity of its expression in 
The Modern Period.  
As this thesis progresses I provide a brief overview of different genealogies as 
they pertain to subjective experience, namely George Bataille’s The Cradle of Humanity, 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, and, as previously stated, Foucault’s History 
of Madness. Before diving into the specifics of the genealogy, it is important to give a 
very general definition of the way in which the terms “subjectivity” and “objectivity” are 
used in this account.  Subjectivity, specifically as it applies to subjective experience, is 
encountered in that which cannot be fully comprehended, scientifized, or universalized. 
Subjective experience varies amongst particular individuals at particular times. 
Objectivity, on the other hand, as one might expect, expresses that which is definable, 
definite, scientific, and understandable. If something is objective, then there can exist 
definite knowledge of it, i.e., it has a truth. While the only truth to subjectivity is that 
there isn’t one, anything objective can be comprehended. Consequently, for a human 
being to be experienced as object is for the human being to have a truth. That truth, as 
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Foucault puts it, is “the truth of man.” The human being, necessarily subjective, also 
becomes objective, and thusly an object.   
In Bataille’s writings on prehistoric people it is the creation of art that originally 
lent itself to, and saw itself in, the formation of the subject. In the Greek Tragedy, 
Nietzsche sees a robust form of art, one allowing a vigorous, drunken, aesthetic, 
subjective experience. However, as we will see in chapter two, this tragedy will be 
eclipsed. For Foucault, it is the language of madness, whether that is in the rich painting 
of Van Gogh, the bombastic writings of Nietzsche, or the plays of Artaud, which exposes 
the subjectivity of the mad to the “objective” gaze. The mad became the locus of 
objectification and scientific discourse. What the language of the mad revealed to the 
scientific, theoretical person is the limits of reason and the bounds of truth. 
Objectification and the extreme alienation of a particular class of people (the mad) 
through this objectification, revealed the subjectivity of the human being, exposed and 
unhinged. Objective gaze thus exposes the anti-natural nature (the chaos) of the human 
being, thereby undermining its own implicit reason for existence. The search for the truth 
of humanity revealed to itself only its inanity. Paradoxically, the objectification of the 
human being fulfilled its own teleology in the revelation that there is no telos. In other 
words, objectively, the human being is subjective.  
This essay concludes with a study of the relationship between the aesthetic 
experience and individual subjectivity. Each of these philosophical genealogies concludes 
with some form of embracement of art. I use this to posit art as the human act of 
subjective, unconscious creation which might be granted prescriptive value in the search 
for, and creation of, one’s “self.” Art, in its many forms and functions, has the power to 
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robustly express subjective experience. If humanity wishes to learn more about itself, 
then it must engage itself with art; specifically, its creation, its critique, and its autonomy. 
Art with objective purpose could mask the subjectivity that art reveals, thereby hiding 
humanity even further from itself. The suggestion, then, is for us to create, ceaselessly 
engage ourselves with that which we create, and refuse the finality of any objective 
answer to a human act of artistic creation. My hope is that this thesis will further the 
possibility of our insight into artistic creation and as a result allow for a reduction in self-
alienation, however so slight. If this thesis achieves nothing more than the continuation of 
this endless discourse, then I will consider it a success. The true tragedy ensues when the 
tragedy is eclipsed, and we are once more cast into the shadows.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
MADNESS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO TRUTH: 
A STUDY OF FOUCAULT’S “THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CIRCLE” 
 
 In one of his earliest and most influential works, History of Madness, Michel 
Foucault narrates a story about the historical circumstances from which arose the truth of 
man; that is, Foucault, through a detailed discussion of the history of madness in the West 
(specifically between its repression in The Classical Age and its 19
th
 century 
psychologisation), attempts to describe what it might mean to be a human being in a 
modern context. As it is exposed through madness and the accompanying science 
surrounding madness in the 19
th
 century, the individual human condition is evinced as 
one of constant self-estrangement. In the movement from the dualism of the classical era 
to “the truth of madness” in the 19th century, arises the disconcerting and alienating truth 
of the human condition.  This truth makes itself visible for the first time, and yet this 
visibility shows something untapped endlessly looming beneath it, i.e., something 
invisible. It is a paradoxical truth that shows the impossibility of the truth. 
Such a paradox may lead to an endless influx of questions. For starters, can one 
ever be acquainted with one’s own truth, and if so, in what sense? Does this “truth of the 
impossibility of the truth” require a degree of self-estrangement within the experience of 
the modern individual? If so, in what sense is an individual that individual, and in what 
sense is an individual concurrently something other than him/herself? Are we what we 
are not? And what sense can possibly be made of such a statement? If one is, in some 
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sense, something beyond/beneath one’s “self,” then what does it mean to assert one’s 
identity, to assert oneself as having particular characteristics? What might be missed by 
such an assertion?  
In this essay it is my goal to elucidate some clues, answers, and new questions 
that may arise from several of the former questions and perhaps some that have been 
overlooked. This undertaking use a study of Foucault’s “Anthropological Circle,” as its 
focus, a brilliant essay on the “nature” of reason and unreason. I will start only with the 
general Foucaultian hypothesis that we are what we are not and that this is only a 
seemingly paradoxical statement, the paradox arising from a play on language or a 
particular, nonsensical interpretation.
1
 However, there are real ramifications that result 
from this form of self-creation and its relationship to the other.  
 In order to understand this alienating truth, it may be necessary to look at the 
conditions under which this truth came about. Perhaps the importance of this historical 
contingency is the very reason Foucault decided to write a history of madness rather than 
merely a study on the present science of the pathological; the place of madness in the 
social sphere and its impact on truth is not historically static. Before the work of Pinel 
and Tuke and the rise of 19
th
 century psychologisation,
2
 to speak of the truth of madness, 
and therefore the truth of the human being, would be to speak an anachronism and 
therefore an unreal truth; it would be empty. It is only once madness is given the liberty 
to be itself (as explained in “The Birth of the Asylum,” the chapter preceding “The 
Anthropological Circle”) that the truth of madness is revealed. Comprehending the 
                                                          
1
 It might be an all too necessary play because it helps draws attention to the strange fact of self-assertion 
and therefore “self” limitation. 
2
 Philippe Pinel and Samuel Tuke are the two major figures referenced by Foucault. He repetitively 
associates each with the early 19
th
 century psychologisation of madness. 
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difference between classical madness and the 19
th
 century experience will reveal certain 
conditions under which knowledge of the truth is made possible and therefore other 
conditions under which it is inaccessible. It is at this point in the History of Madness that 
knowledge of the modern human condition can be glimpsed for the first time. However, 
as Foucault mysteriously and paradoxically writes, this glimpse coincides with its elusion 
(512). It reveals itself, but in this revelation it proclaims its invisibility as a “stubborn 
presence that never allowed itself to be entirely grasped” (Foucault 512).3  
Speculatively, could it then be the case that other historical 
circumstances/conditions might render the truth entirely visible? Might there be the 
hopeful possibility of building a bridge over the abyss to an “un-alienated” land, by 
which I mean a new type of human experience presently unknown, or a new engagement 
with experience? Might one also search for a base to this abyss, that is, a base to the 
human condition of madness and the non-natural? If this is the case, that is, if there is a 
point at which the self-estrangement opens back up into self-fulfillment, then one could 
claim that the correct course of action might be for scientists/psychologists to submerge 
themselves in their studies and make their technical discourse as pronounced, intense, and 
dispersed as possible. However, if this is not the case, then there may always be an 
important role left up to the philosopher. There might not be a bottom to the well, and in 
fact we may safely assume this to be the case, but what harm is done in diving further 
into that dark pool? There might not be an “ocean floor” to the “endless abyss.” 
                                                          
3
 The relationship Foucault implicitly makes between the visible and invisible, though rarely using such 
language, is open to a straightforward comparison with Jacques Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-
Portrait and Other Ruins, an essay on blindness in painting and drawing. Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind is 
an investigation into artwork of which blindness is the subject matter, and subsequently an investigation 
into the invisible made visible, a representation of that which is lacking, i.e., a manifestation of non-being. 
There are several instances over the course of the History of Madness in which Foucault draws parallels 
between blindness and madness. 
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However, such an undertaking might grant access to greater instrumental knowledge, that 
is, “useful knowledge,” applicable to both philosophical investigation and scientific 
theory. Therefore, while psychoanalysis/psychology may never reduce us to our “primary 
being” and uncover the essence/nature of humanity, it might meaningfully aid in human 
experience.
 4
 Though the endlessness of scientific investigation and its reductivism opens 
the door to a problem of infinite regress, it closes the door on completion, safety, and 
unwieldy ennui. As a result of the nature of the infinite, that is, the abyss/the eternal, 1 is 
greater than 0 and concurrently no closer to reaching a destination, no closer to infinity, 
or a mysterious (and impossible) final number.  This mathematical idea of infinity 
functions analogously to the modern subjective experience. The Foucaultian must 
sacrifice the idea of a destination and the embracement of the infinite. Progression is 
toward nothing; the longstanding tradition of teleology, as it is applied in the sciences, is 
lost through the methods employed in its name. These conclusions make themselves 
more apparent after further investigation into the history of madness.  
 The movement from the classical conception of madness to that of the 19
th
 
century is key to understanding the conditions under which the truth makes itself known, 
or more precisely, glimpsed. One can pick up this history with a look at the structure of 
the classical era in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. The two primary classical physicians that 
Foucault uses (perhaps unfairly) to represent this period are Philippe Pinel and Samuel 
Tuke. Both are known for instituting a form of moral therapy that supposedly allowed for 
the mad to regain their liberty/freedom. The dialectic of The Classical Age exposes itself 
in the praise heaped on these two figures. This dialectic seems to be one that pertains to 
                                                          
4
 This is in reference to a particular sense of the word “meaningful.” In another sense it might better 
uncover the meaninglessness of the human experience. 
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the classical conception of liberty. As Foucault describes it, this dialectic is rooted in a 
paradox of liberty. The classical conception of liberty is one grounded on a belief of 
liberty in which liberty must not be itself. Foucault argues that although Pinel and Tuke 
claim to have restored liberty to those they have “re-normalized,” liberty was at all times 
already within the mad. It is an experience of liberty that uses itself to destroy itself: “The 
liberty of the madman is only ever in that instant, that imperceptible distance that makes a 
man free to abandon his liberty and chain himself to his madness” (513). Liberty, 
conceived as such, is, by necessity, that which must require the possibility of 
enslavement; it becomes reliant upon the other. “The instant” of which Foucault speaks is 
one in which a decision is made, a decision to allow oneself to be overtaken by one’s 
emotions or desires and, essentially, to make oneself mad. In this instant, the moral 
responsibility placed on the mad, within The Classical Age, becomes illuminated. One is 
not free unless one has the choice to constitute oneself as that which is not free, i.e., the 
mad person. “Madness, at bottom,” writes Foucault, “was only possible in so far as it had 
that latitude around it, the leeway that allowed the subject to speak the language of his 
own madness, and constitute himself as mad” (512 – 513).  Freedom defines itself 
through the possibility of enslavement. If one is not free to enslave oneself, then one has 
not reached the limits of that freedom. According to Foucault, the operations of Pinel and 
Tuke lie well within the classical experience of madness, an experience that has a 
contradictory structure embedded within it. For these physicians to assert that they give a 
person back her freedom by holding her accountable for limiting that freedom, is for 
them to admit that they have limited another’s freedom. They are therefore claiming that 
to enslave is to free; to limit freedom is to obtain freedom. We are not yet in a position to 
13 
 
assert or condemn such a questionable claim, but the novelty of it is astounding. Claiming 
that one has a moral responsibility not to enslave oneself, as Pinel and Tuke do, is to 
claim that one ought to enslave oneself, albeit in a different manner. It is the removal of a 
choice by the reinstatement of choice.   
Freedom, in its absolute sense, is shown as being that which must not be. When it 
is looked for in those that are totally free, i.e., the mad, it makes a mockery of itself. In 
other words, it is impossible for freedom to exist as the classical conception of the term 
would have one believe because there cannot be freedom in absolute freedom. If it did 
exist, it would be what it is not; therefore, it would not be even when it is. It would be 
constituted by nothingness. Foucault writes: “the freedom which made classical madness 
possible was suffocated inside this madness itself, and collapses in that which manifested 
its contradictions most cruelly.” (513-514). To restate: liberty allows one to constitute 
oneself as mad,
5
 and madness is that in which one has become savagely enslaved to such 
as desire, passions, etc. The freedom of the era that gave rise to classical madness 
becomes bondage in the madness to which it gives rise. “Freedom” for some must mean 
restriction for others. Therefore it must be that liberty, as defined in the Classical Age, is 
inherently repressive. Seen in this light classical liberty is not liberty “in itself,” but rather 
the objectification of a concept. “What the late eighteenth century witnessed was not the 
liberation of the mad but an objectification of the concept of their liberty” (515). 
 This objectification of liberty by the late classical age is an important cause of the 
end of that era and the beginning of the next, in which the scientific search became more 
precise and determined. This pathway was opened because of the ambiguity of the 
                                                          
5
 Foucault writes: “…in the classical experience, madness can at the same time be slightly criminal, slightly 
faked, slightly immoral and slightly reasonable too” (514). Each of these shows a way in which the 
individual could be held responsible for his/her madness. 
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classical conception of the mad. The objectification of the concept is one in which the 
destruction of ambiguity must be sought, and thus the destruction of that era of 
ambiguity. The movement toward science is the logical progression of this thought. There 
is little objective about that which is ambiguous.
6
  In order to satisfy the condition of 
objectification, ambiguity must be destroyed. Thusly one era ends as another begins with 
a more pronounced order.  
This is the objectification of liberty: the reification and capture of freedom. This 
objectification must also objectify the people embodying that freedom, i.e., the mad, as 
the mad are the most literal reified form of freedom. It alienates the mad from their 
humanity, which is, decidedly, free.
7
 This ambiguous conception of the classical era was 
one that would open a door for the mad to be treated as simultaneously free and 
determined, that is, concurrently responsible and irresponsible. If the mad are treated as 
those that are enslaved to their own savage will, as Foucault puts it, then it follows that 
those physicians at work with the mad are going to start searching for causes and 
breaking points at which one becomes mad in order to maintain freedom and control 
(515). They might look at those places at which people are using their liberty too 
extensively and without restraint. They might deem some quantitative excessive exercise 
of liberty as liberty’s end, not a teleological end, but rather a limit, a threshold. This is the 
process of objectification.  How can such an objectifying look at liberty take place 
objectively? How can such a construction of liberty be made scientific? Since it cannot be 
                                                          
6
 It could be the case that this is a wide-ranging “rule” that extends beyond the sciences. In other words, 
ambiguity regarding any concept seems to spark a need to objectify that concept and clarify that which is 
distorted. Objectification, then, might be that which is sparked by a fear of the unknown, or a will to 
know. Ironically, at least in the case explored in this paper, that need to know reveals the impossibility of 
knowledge.  
7
 This will later play out in Foucault’s writing as a rivalry between science and art, as representatives of 
restraint and freedom.  
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scientifically quantified or qualativized, liberty can only be made a scientific concept if it 
lets itself be grounded in the morality from which it grew. The scientific grounding for 
freedom has moral underpinnings. One finds scientific conventions based upon the moral 
conventions of the era. It is, once more, science grounded in moral judgment. Science, 
more generally, in order to function as a science, links itself with the deterministic nature 
of cause and effect as they result from physically understood principles. Morality and 
liberty, on the other hand, are founded on the exercise of free will. Liberty presupposes 
the self as the causal agent, i.e., that one is the executor of one’s own actions.  
Here one can see a confusing pair, one that results in an entangled study which 
imposes a paradoxical structure on its subject, i.e., the mad. The mad became the loci of 
extreme freedom (due to their lack of restraint when granted liberty) and extreme 
determinism (due to their being objects of scientific research) together as if they are at the 
limits and totality of both. Foucault writes, “The mad of the nineteenth century were to be 
both subject to determinism and guilty: their non-freedom was more infused with guilt 
than the freedom in which the mad of the classical age were able to escape themselves” 
(515). As this freedom was objectified in the classical age, so the era gave birth to a new 
one, that is, one of stricter science through psychologisation. Within the conundrum 
between determinism and free will outlined above, a philosophical anthropology arose in 
psychology. The search for human essence took a turn, one rooted in science and 
objectification. The doors opened by psychology show just how tightly locked the 
following set of doors will always be to scientific investigation. The more revealed by 
science, the clearer it becomes that it requires something other. It is in this era of 
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psychology that the truth becomes known, and therefore unknowable, and that truth is 
because of “the truth of this truth” (516). 
 Now let madness speak endlessly and alienate itself. Let it speak its own truth. 
Let it make itself as visible as possible so that we can see just how invisible it makes its 
own truth. In the 19
th
 century, the confinement and silence of madness was lifted (at least 
partially) and given back its voice. The search for scientific liberty led to the upswing in 
the discourse on madness. According to Foucault, or, at the very least, a particular 
interpretation of his work, it is the objectification of liberty that reignited the language of 
madness, a language that was hidden in the ambiguity and non-being the mad represented 
in The Classical Age. Before this objectification the mad person was “the void of non-
being and the paradoxical manifestation of that void” (516). The mad, as those more or 
less enslaved during The Great Confinement,
8
 were instantiations of nothingness trapped 
inside of a physical body. In a sense, the mad were thought to have lost their humanity 
when they lost their free will; they were both slaves to their own passions and slaves 
within the system of confinement. In The Classical Age the mad were human beings 
without humanity. This is the paradoxical manifestation of the void underlying this 
epoch. On what grounds could one be considered simultaneously human and inhuman?  
One might safely draw the conclusion that it must have been free will, i.e., liberty, which 
made a human being a human being in classical reasoning.  Liberty defined a particularly 
human condition. When this is lost, humanity is lost, and the person who loses it is no 
longer a person but rather an embodied nothingness. Most people with liberty, selfhood, 
and humanity would feel an unyielding fear at the thought of its absence and the life of 
                                                          
8
 In the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries houses of confinement were built across Europe. These houses confined 
the mad along with the unemployed and the criminal class in many instances. Perhaps the most famous 
chapter of The History of Madness, “The Great Confinement,” is written on this subject.  
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slavery or death.  How might such a fear of loss and death effect interactions with the 
mad? Might it be that an intolerable fear of becoming nothing arises with the sight of 
these walking, fleshy bodies of void?  
 If being a human being necessarily means being free, then maintenance of this 
freedom becomes a paradigm for all science involved in philosophical anthropology. To 
maintain freedom one must know what it takes to lose that freedom, and therefore 
madness becomes a necessary part of reality. As was stated above, Foucault believes that 
the mad were considered both guilty and determined in the 19
th
 century (515). They are 
guilty for having extinguished their own freedom. However, is it the case that one can 
remain guilty when one is no longer oneself? Nothingness cannot be guilty because 
nothingness cannot be anything, and yet we have seen that the mad are guilty, even in 
their innocence. Thusly, it must be the case that the mad could no longer be considered 
walking voids, or embodied, silent nothingness. It is much more important for the mad to 
remain guilty than for the mad to remain embodied nothingness. This is because guilt is 
the result of the moral code that drives the objectification of liberty. As one attempts to 
correct the paradox of liberty (to stop something from birthing nothingness, to stop 
humanity from destroying itself) by objectifying it, then one also realizes the necessity of 
the objectified, i.e., the mad. The mad must be granted the status of being; they must have 
a “somethingness,” or, in other words, a truth, an essence. The mad are granted their own 
truths.  If science is to objectify a moral concept, then it must have an object to objectify. 
The mad must become that object precisely because they are the locus of guilt; they are 
the reason the concept of liberty needs resolving. What is it of which they are the guilty 
party? Specifically, they are guilty of becoming nothing. They are guilty of shunning 
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liberty. How does one objectify nothingness? It is here that the inanity and unreason of 
the entire era exposes itself at the ends of its reason: the mad must have truth because 
they have none.  
 Does not this formulation show the limits of the classical notion of liberty? 
Though a critique of such liberty is not stated outright in the Foucault, it resides therein. 
Firstly, it is a form of liberty that requires the loss of liberty at a certain point. Too great 
an exercise of this liberty leads to enslavement through the loss of free will. It is a 
conception of liberty that is already foiled by its self-restraint; it is freedom in bondage 
without the awareness of such bondage. Secondly, liberty objectified/reified as such is 
variable and unequal in two senses: 1.) the extent to which free will can be practiced 
without slippage into nothingness may depend on the individual and 2.) the extent to 
which an exposure of a deeper level of human subjectivity reveals the truth of 
nothingness is variable dependent upon social and historical context. The former might 
arise most clearly within problems of objectifying liberty as it arises in science and the 
scientific method. The latter will do the same but on a more macroscopic level. Perhaps 
both may show the way in which “the truth of humanity” is variable and infinite. There is 
a unique, individual truth, subject to change at all times, but there is also a greater, 
underlying truth that unites all humanity across time; this is revealed in the infinite. 
However, knowledge of the infinite truth only comes to light once those who can expose 
it are free and able to do so. 
 This brings the discussion back to the language of madness. In order to discover 
what makes the mad into the mad, one must talk to the mad, and more importantly, one 
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must listen. As the mad return to language they also return to truth.
9
 Nothingness cannot 
speak.  The confinement of The Classical Age must end and the discourse must ignite; 
this is precisely what Foucault writes of when he references the psychologisation of 
madness. Foucault suggests that we “listen to its first utterances” born from the 
objectification of liberty (516). How beautiful this revelation is, exposed by this 
objectification, and how humorous the failure of an “adequate” objectification, whatever 
that might mean. The science is endlessly self-perpetuating and growing. Foucault 
realizes this and smartly titles the chapter accordingly. 
 The language of madness as described by Foucault is one that announces “poetry 
of the heart” (517). He references the 19th century poets Friedrich Hölderlin and Gérard 
de Nerval, along with philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, in order to make his point.  All 
three figures led lives that one would most likely consider mentally unstable and tragic. 
However, these madmen were bursting with a language of poetry. Foucault writes: 
 
This language of madness was reborn, but as a lyrical explosion: the 
discovery that in man, the interior was also the exterior, that the extremity 
of subjectivity blended into the immediate fascination of the object, and 
that any ending was the promise of an obstinate return. A language in 
which what transpired were no longer the invisible figures of the world, 
but the secret truths of man. (518) 
  
                                                          
9
 There is an essential tie between the use of language and the application of truth. The truth found 
within language must stand over the abyss that the mad expose. This will become clear in the later 
investigation of Nietzsche and post-structuralist theory as it is applied to language.  
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Madness, says Foucault, came “announcing man’s senseless secret” (518). Its 
lyricism and poetry open up an exploration at the end of the day and into an eternal night. 
One of the most objective things we can know about ourselves is revealed in the language 
of the mad: our own deep, unreasonable subjectivity.  The objective and the subjective 
are shown not to be at odds with one another.  Rather they are partners in human truth. 
Foucault believes that this interplay led the mad of the 19
th
 century to be simultaneously 
treated with a greater neutrality and passion (518).  Greater scientific neutrality arose in 
part because of medical advancement and the destruction of apparent social and moral 
factors. The mad made visible a darker truth in a way similar to the world of dreams. 
Studying these two realms led to greater knowledge of the truth of the human condition. 
A greater passion was placed on the mad for a similar reason: it is in the mad that we see 
ourselves reflected. General human truth is revealed through madness and aligns itself 
with the truth of madness, the truth of nothingness. Foucault, quoting a character from a 
Hoffman novel, writes “I firmly believe that through abnormal phenomena, Nature 
allows us to peer into the most fearsome abysses” (519). 
Foucault does not make explicit why it is that one can “feel the same forces, hear 
the same voices and see the same strange lights rise up within” when one engages with 
the mad. Yet it is clear that this passionate connection can only be felt in a context in 
which the mad are given voice (519). In The Classical Age no such connection could be 
made. The mad were segregated in their confinement and conceived as non-beings. Only 
once the mad were given back their voice, a gorgeous and Romantic voice, were the 
“normal” able to see themselves reflected in the mad. Reading the poetry of a madman is 
like listening to an eruption of violence, passion, and excess rising out of the darker 
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recesses of the human experience. One sees one’s own hidden gems and nightmares 
reflected in the shameless and brilliant writings of the mad. The literature grips and acts 
as a force that primitively creates a sensation in the reader. The reader, i.e., the gazer or 
spectator sees himself reflected in this madness. He sees the way in which he shares this 
passion.
10
  “This gaze,” writes Foucault, “…could promise itself the spectacle of a naked 
truth of man” (519). The mad had their own truth restored in the objectification of liberty. 
Now, in the literature and voice to which this objectification needed to give birth, 
madness held the truth of all humanity.  As Foucault will outline more clearly in the final 
pages of History of Madness, he believes it is art that holds the world responsible for 
madness. The language of madness, the oeuvre produced by the madman or on the 
madman, is infused with guilt.
11
 
Madness is given “the virtues of a mirror” in which all of humanity sees itself 
reflected in this exposed subjectivity, and yet what this reflection shows is merely a 
primal and mechanical truth about humanity (519). The “elementary truth” that madness 
revealed was the abyss in the human, that is, the deep subjectivity that always underlies 
the layered objectivity (519). In it, one sees a substance at once wholly unreasonable and 
basic. The elementary truth that Foucault describes is one of desire, primal urge and 
mechanical reaction. Life is not guided by reason in this reduction. The human being is 
reduced to a biological sack of flesh and stripped of all pretension. Madness has exposed 
a dark secret: we are not inherently moral beings. Nor are we perfected sons and 
daughters of a benevolent creator.  Most radically, we are not even primarily rational 
                                                          
10
 Now the relationship that Foucault needs between the mad and the normal is set for an egalitarian 
politics. This point connects with his analysis of Velazquez’s “Las Meninas” as the spectator is in that 
which she spectates. When one looks at the mad one sees the truth of oneself in her. 
11
 For a detailed discussion of the oeuvre refer to chapter three. 
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beings, even if, as Aristotle writes, this feature remains a distinguishing characteristic of 
the species.  
Though Foucault does not travel down this route, one might find in his writing the 
way in which scientific objectification and the language of art, as they are combined in 
the truth exposed by the mad, is a truth of our animality. It is a truth of drives and urges. 
However, as the spectator sees this reduction of human truth in madness, that is, the 
founding unreason, the spectator’s reaction reveals a level of humanity that is beyond 
animality and yet within it. It is an animalistic desire to be other than the animal. It is a 
fear of our own truth. It is a fear of the bottomless abyss, a fear of being what one must 
be: an animal. Here is the torment of humanity: the inescapability of being what one 
wishes to be beyond. The sickest part of all, that by which we shake ourselves to sleep: 
the realization that our want to be more than what we are is caused by what we are in 
conjunction with the realization that, elementarily, we will never be more than what we 
are. We want what cannot be had, and when we desire to be gods instead of animals we 
doom ourselves to misery. Our nature allows for the capacity of self-hatred. If, as 
Foucault states, “the madness of an action was precisely determined by the fact that no 
reason could ever exhaust it,” then all see their own truths reflected in the mad (520). 
Madness exposes the unreasonableness, as well as the problem of infinite regression, 
inherent within all action. One sees one’s own truth reflected in madness. The truth of the 
mad is the truth of humanity, and therefore humanity’s truth is one of madness. 
If such is the case, and “there is a madness in us all,” then the mad can, at least 
partially, be freed of their responsibility for their own madness. Throughout The Classical 
Age the mad were a guilty party, in the sense that they were morally responsible; guilty 
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of enslaving themselves and destroying liberty. Now, in the truth that the mad reveal, it is 
the world that is made guilty in the face of madness. It could be the case that it is the push 
to be more than what we are that forces us to sink into something so deeply below that 
which we are. An unmanageable subjectivity, i.e., pure subjectivity might be birthed from 
a rigorous devotion to objectivity. It is “pure subjectivity” that stands at the threshold 
between the sane and insane.  
Along with Foucault we have discussed the elementary truth of humanity as it is 
exposed by madness, but this elementary truth gives rise to a further truth: the terminal 
truth. The terminal truth expresses the fact of a limit, or boundary, to subjectivity. The 
terminal truth shows how far one “could be pushed by the passions, life in society and 
everything that distanced him from a primitive nature that knew no madness” (520). 
Madness is something that arises within a society as it distances itself from the primitive 
and “uncivilized” life. If the natural and primitive exposed by madness is, as we have 
stated, one based on elementary desires and urges, then madness is seen to arise in a 
social context in which the repression of these desires is great. Madness is not something 
that arises independent of historical context.  It might therefore be considered something 
apart from mental disease, though mental disease itself is still something only determined 
as such within certain societal contexts. Foucault, quoting Matthey, writes, “’According 
to reports from travelers, savages are not subject to disorders of the intellectual 
functions’” (520). The philosophical point continues to loom independently of the factual 
accuracy of these traveler’s reports. The relevance lies in Matthey’s experience of these 
“savages.” It seems evident that in a society judged as “savage” there could not be 
“madness” because primitive drives are not so thoroughly repressed. The repression of 
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these drives, and hence the manifestation of madness, would almost certainly be more 
prevalent in a societal context that morally condemns other societies by slamming the 
inhabitants of those other societies with such derogatory titles such as “savage” or 
“barbarian.” This contextualizing of the existence of madness places the responsibility for 
the creation of madness on the society. As was the case duringThe Classical Age, that 
society which blamed/guilted the mad into taking responsibility for their own madness 
was itself the guilty party.  This seems particularly sinister as such a society seeks to hide 
its own responsibility within that which is its victim. The terminal truth holds society 
accountable for the discovery of this truth’s existence. Society is responsible for pushing 
its outliers to the cliff’s edge, watching them fall, and ridiculing them for losing their 
balance. Madness shows the limits of the forces of passion, and becomes an issue when 
passion is strangled within a society that does not permit its fruition. In its hopeless 
resistance to society’s power, repressed passions are forced to their limit and erupt in 
wild abandonment, i.e., madness. “Madness began when the world began to age,” writes 
Foucault, “and every face that madness took over the course of times spoke of the shape 
and truth of that corruption” (520).  
Why might Foucault write that the world “began to age,” as though there is an 
origin to aging, as if there were a time before aging? Certainly he does not mean that the 
world has always been “aging;” if he did, there would be no social critique since the 
essence of the world would bear madness within it. If madness originates at the same 
point at which “aging” originates, then perhaps if one found the cause of aging, one could 
find the cause of madness, i.e., the reason for unreason. Perhaps there was always a truth 
(the truth of non-truth) as it is exposed by madness, but this does not mean that the world 
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ages before that truth manifests itself. The metaphor of aging is meant to capture the way 
in which society has grown advanced and civilized while simultaneously losing its vigor 
and lust. When was it that this shift occurs?
12
 
Foucault does not pursue this idea of aging at much length, but his closing pages, 
and their remarks on artwork, might hold the key. It might be possible that madness 
results in a context in which we distance ourselves from the creation of art. As I will 
discuss later, for Foucault, art is that which contains no madness and yet is closest to it. 
Art is the exhibition of excess, but rather than being a slippage, it is an exaltation of 
humanity. Perhaps it is at this moment, a time of art, that the world began to age. If 
madness began as the world began to grow old, it does not necessarily mean that this 
“aging” had yet been manifested in the human body. It only means that repression, 
objectification, and the pursuit of knowledge/truth began to unfold in a broad, 
macroscopic, universal, and arrogant manner. This could at root be tied to the 
philosophical need for “knowledge of the good life,” and a life in accordance with “truth” 
which, accordingly, treats lives that do not meet this criterion as objectively bad. If a 
history of guilt could be traced, then perhaps it would mark the point in time at which 
certain lives were posited as evil, just as Nietzsche outlined in his Genealogy of Morals. 
Repression, in a sense, begins with philosophy. The truth of madness lies in the non-truth 
birthed from this pursuit of truth. 
However, I do not wish to argue too greatly that there must be some sort of 
transcendent and paradoxical eternal truth. To claim that Foucault believes such a thing 
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 In later pages we will investigate the “aging” process, and coincidentally the birth of madness, through 
a look at early art, both prehistoric and ancient Greek as George Bataille and Friedrich Nietzsche interpret 
them respectively. Foucault discusses a relationship between art and madness that exposes closeness in 
status but also an unbridgeable gulf which forever distances them.  
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would be to claim that he undermines his own project. The search for truth is the search 
to repress that which is non-truth, i.e., that which is false in light of the discovered truth. 
And yet perhaps this is Foucault’s goal. If the truth of humanity, and hence its non-truth, 
is glimpsed in the eyes of the mad, and all truth seeks to repress that which is not true, 
then it seems Foucault is pushing an agenda which makes him just as suspect  as the very 
thing he seems to be criticizing. If Foucault is stating that there is a truth, and that it is not 
the truth that is sought by the objectification of liberty, along with the simultaneous 
neutrality and passion with which the mad are treated, then that lends itself to a criticism 
of the current state. If truth represses that which is non-truth, then it would seem that 
Foucault is hoping to overturn the current state of objectification with his own truth. 
However, this must not of necessity be the case. If human truth is non-truth, perhaps 
more accurately, unreason, then it cannot posit any reasonable truth in place of that which 
it condemns. In a sense, Foucault condemns guilt, and must therefore rest his work on a 
paradox. Foucault writes: 
 
…the human truth that madness reveals is the immediate contradiction of 
the moral and social truth of man. The initial moment of any treatment is 
thus repression of the inadmissible truth, the abolition of the evil that 
reigns there, and the forgetting of this violence and these desires…Man 
will thus not speak the truth of his truth other than in the cure that will lead 
him from his alienated truth to the truth of man. (521)                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Above, Foucault seems to be aware of the tight predicament his analysis created. 
The human truth that madness reveals is shown through madness, but it is not necessarily 
27 
 
in madness. It reveals itself not only in madness, but in the repression of madness and 
“the inadmissible truth” (520).  What is admissible is that part of truth that seeks to 
repress the rest of the truth. Foucault’s project, then, is not aimed at displacing one truth 
with another, but at revealing a contradictory attitude in the modern and contemporary 
view of truth. That inadmissible truth, i.e., the truth of our violence and desire, is not of 
necessity the whole of human truth. Better put, it is the whole of human truth, but there is 
a part of that truth which wishes to be more than what it is and thereby seeks to make 
invisible the part of itself that does not share this wish. This total truth therefore alienates 
itself. In the passage above, Foucault distinguishes between the alienated truth and the 
truth of man. The truth of man, i.e., the human truth, is the result of the cure for the 
alienated truth. However, it is the search for a cure that originally caused the alienated 
truth to exist. It is the dissatisfaction of truth with itself that causes its self-alienation. It is 
a truth that is trying to rid itself of itself. It cannot not be alienating. Even if that part of 
the truth which is currently alienated can be set free, this in turn alienates the part of the 
truth that wishes to be something more than bestial violence and desire. Perhaps all that 
can be desired on such a model is a swing back to the center in which neither part of the 
whole of truth (the desiring/violent and the wish to be something more) alienates the 
other to its limit. Humanity seeks to be both God an animal, but never itself, thereby 
alienating itself. Such extremity in alienation is responsible for the mad. 
Although it is hard to speak of anything else, it is worrisome to continue using 
such a model of truth in which there must be constant self-alienation. Perhaps truth 
conceived as such, and the search for truth generally, can only serve a climate of 
alienation. The necessity of self-alienation seems to imply the lack of the ability for one 
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to achieve one’s truth and therefore self-fulfillment. Human truth implies the 
impossibility of fulfilling that truth. The search for such a truth could only further the 
present idea of truth as a point to be realized, and yet it cannot be realized. This search for 
truth would only further the power of institutions designed to help one obtain the 
unobtainable, see the invisible, and be that which cannot be according to its own model. 
One must drop the search for truth, not in order to find it, but in order to free oneself from 
the self-imposed baggage of alienation, dissatisfaction, and guilt. Such seems to be the 
implicit, anti-metaphysical argument hidden in the pages of Foucault’s descriptive 
account of madness.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
ORIGINS OF SUBJECTIVITY, OBJECTIVITY, AND THEIR SIMULTANEITY IN 
THE MODERN HUMAN EXPERIENCE: 
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN NIETZSCHE, BATAILLE, AND FOUCAULT 
 
 Throughout The History of Madness Foucault often makes note of the “language 
of madness,” a language whose form remains vague and unrefined to the reader until the 
latest pages of the book. This language of the mad was long suppressed (and therefore not 
extrapolated upon by Foucault) by the Great Confinement and subsequently the absolute 
silence of madness in the 19
th
 century asylum. The historical time period of which 
Foucault’s writing is primarily concerned, that is, the Classical Age of Enlightenment, 
took great pains to blot out madness and silence it to the dungeons of confinement. 
Thusly its language, and the experience of madness by the mad of the Classical Age, will 
remain, in large part, forever a mystery.  
 However, as I have attempted to outline in the preceding chapter, the “freedom” 
of the mad that resulted from the activity of Pinel and Tuke at the end of the 18
th
 century 
opened the door for a new experience of madness in the 19
th
 century, one grounded not 
only on a certain medical morality, but also of an experience of madness by the mad in 
which they became the objects of their own gaze. As the mad were freed from their 
physical chains they were forced to confront their own madness from the objective gaze 
of a particular bourgeois morality presented as if it were objective reason. In doing so, 
according to Foucault, the mad were separated from their own madness and gazed upon 
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the truth of their madness from “the truth of man” (Foucault 516). “Madness was no 
longer to speak of non-being, but of the being of man” (516). There is a split that occurs 
in this new experience of madness. The mad, freed from their chains, are able to speak 
for the first time in centuries, but in two separate ways, both of which reaffirm the truth 
of man born through madness:  
1.) Madness as that which silences itself when it reflects upon its own 
madness as madness, thereby reinforcing the domination of this morality 
through an internalized enslavement. Though the mad are freed from their 
chains and straightjackets, the mad, in this instance, are imbued with an 
internalized guilt that reflects the reason/morality of the age. Their liberty 
and language serve only to annihilate themselves, as does that of all of 
humanity under the weight of the public consciousness.  
2.) Madness as that which chatters without end, never exhausting its own 
limit in the lyricism that its language breeds. Here, madness finds itself 
once more expressed in poetry, literature, art, and, for the first time, in 
philosophy. “…the mad,” writes Foucault, “were examined with both 
more neutrality and more passion” (518). The language of madness is 
either that of absolute silence in the object (being) or the inane endless 
chattering of the subject (nothingness).  
 In both instances, in the new freedom attained by madness, it finds itself 
estranged and self-alienated from this freedom. In the first case, madness makes itself an 
object, and thusly eliminates itself and its subjectivity in this objectification. The mad, 
though free from their metallic shackles, are now shackled in the objectivity of 
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Enlightenment morality, morality that instills a sense of guilt in the mad for their 
madness. One is made guilty by society for being what one is and must internalize the 
norms of the society, perhaps for the maintenance of the state and public order. As is the 
case in Rousseau, the human being is alienated from herself in the civil state. This 
objectification of liberty was expounded upon in the previous chapter and will not be 
extrapolated upon here. 
 Rather, this chapter will concern itself with the second case outlined above, that 
is, the lyricism that was birthed from the madness experienced in the 19
th
 century. It will 
seek to view this alienation and the lyrical power of its expression as the culmination of a 
long, historical trend. Madness in the 19
th
 century is experienced as the limits of human 
subjectivity and simultaneously the absolute objectification of man. It may then be useful, 
and exciting, to reflect on theories of the origins of human subjectivity and objectivity as 
they are expressed by two very creative and intellectual figures, namely Friedrich 
Nietzsche and George Bataille. Bataille’s studies of prehistoric cave art, as exemplified in 
his collection of essays, The Cradle of Humanity, function in part as a study of the origins 
of human subjectivity. On the other hand, part of Nietzsche’s project in the Birth of 
Tragedy reveals a possible origin of human objectivity, even if such a revelation is not 
central to Nietzsche’s main project.13 Whether either of these philosophers is correct as to 
the exact historical moment of these origins is not the issue at hand.
14
 Rather, we are 
                                                          
13
 Nietzsche’s “main project” in The Birth of Tragedy, as the title suggests, is a study of the rise of Greek 
tragedy. For Nietzsche the Greek tragedy represented the heights of artistic achievement thus attained. 
14
 It could also be debated as to whether there is an exact moment at which either subjectivity or 
objectivity was birthed. One could easily make the case that they have been building over long, historical 
epochs and that there is no one moment at which one can point to the formation of either. However, it 
might certainly be the case that there are important turning points in history where these concepts take 
on a new face, perhaps more visible. The Modern Age, the prehistoric era described by Bataille, and the 
rise of Socratic thought in Ancient Greece might also be particular “moments” of relevance to this 
dialectic.  
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concerned with the conditions under which these historic accomplishments took place, 
and the human experience they led to and resulted from. Seen together, the origins of 
subjectivity and objectivity might aid in a more totalized understanding of the language 
of madness in the Modern Age, as this language functions as a culmination of both. This 
paper seeks to show the possibility of the following hypothesis: that the human being is 
necessarily both subject and object, that the status of this experience has changed across 
history, and that the modern human subject is situated in such a milieu as to feel the 
brute strength of both her objectivity and subjectivity. 
 The contemporary situation, as elucidated through the inane chattering of the 
mad, may signal a return to a long repressed subjective experience. Foucault may have 
implicitly understood the language of madness as something simultaneously new and 
specific to its milieu, but also as a return to an unfathomably deep subjectivity. Foucault 
writes: 
 
Madness speaks the language of the great return: not the epic return from 
long odysseys, in the undefined path traced out by the myriad roads of the 
real, but a lyrical return in one lightning instant, which matures at a stroke 
the tempest of completeness, illuminating and pacifying it in a 
rediscovered origin. (518) 
 
This strike of lightning, this moment of return, is a momentary relapse, a return that 
occurs right at the death of that of which it is the limit. The phrase “tempest of 
completeness” shows that the moment of return, while occurring in “one lightning 
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instant” is the instant of completeness, a moment of fulfillment, but still the product of a 
complicated series of socio-historical structures. This completeness is born as a storm, a 
tempest. Madness, then, is the complete return to the experience of unabashed, 
unrestrained subjectivity. The language of madness speaks of a rebirth, or more 
specifically, eruption, of human subjectivity. 
 In the eyes of philosopher, anthropologist, and literary figure, George Bataille, the 
original birth of the human subject also occurred in a moment, albeit after an enormous 
period of incubation. Bataille, an early 20
th
 century thinker, wrote numerous essays on 
the culture and art of prehistoric peoples. In part, his reason for doing so was to uncover a 
piece of what it is that makes a human being a human being, in a robust, philosophic, and 
mystical sense. In his writing he explores the similarities and vast differences between 
many prehistoric people and the modern human subject. Perhaps in our analysis of 
Bataille’s birth of subjectivity and Foucault’s “rebirth” we will be able to uncover part of 
what it means to be a human most fundamentally as well as how this plays out more 
specifically in modern times. For Bataille, subjectivity is an inherent trait of the human 
being, but for Foucault subjective experience is much more specific to the particular 
milieu. Therefore a synthesis might allow one to provide a metaphysical and 
anthropological account of the human being. 
 The “birth” of humanity, as Bataille investigates it throughout several essays in 
The Cradle of Humanity, occurs in stages, but also in a particular moment. For Bataille, 
that which makes a human being into a human being must specifically be that which 
distinguishes him from all other species. At the least, the traits that are distinctly human 
seem to be those qualities which are of the greatest interest to Bataille. Working with the 
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limited anthropological data of the time, Bataille chooses to compare the prehistoric 
Homo sapien to the Neanderthals (as well as to “monkeys”) in order to elicit fundamental 
differences between them; he uses the Neanderthals as a link between Homo sapiens and 
“monkeys” to show a gradual progression toward self-awareness and majesty. These 
Neanderthals resemble modern man but not enough to “make soldiers out of them” or to 
“march in a straight line,” making note of the physical distinctions between the two 
species (Bataille 88). Besides their basic physical differences, the important distinction 
between the Homo sapien and the Neanderthal does not lie in the ability to create a useful 
tool or conceptually perceive life and death. In fact, the Neanderthal was perfectly 
capable of both and, according to Bataille, “might in fact have offered a burial for his 
dead fellow creature” (89). Rather, the distinction lies on the level of comportment. The 
Neanderthal differs from the Homo sapien in that he/she/it never made works of art.
15
  
“The human species,” remarks Bataille, “in the strict sense of the word made works of 
art” (89). This distinguishing feature of the human being holds interesting implications 
for the more existential questions Bataille is drawn to investigate. It is this impulse, that 
is, the impulse to art, and not one of rationality or intellect, which separates the human 
being from the other creatures of Earth.  
                                                          
15
 Evidence that has come to light in recent years suggests the possibility of cave art that could have been 
produced by Neanderthals in parts of Spain. According to Ker Than with National Geographic News, much 
of this evidence is still controversial and whether or not the art can be attributed to Neanderthals is still 
debatable. The art is said to be slightly over 40,000 years old, a time when Neanderthals and Homo 
sapiens were known to concurrently inhabit the area. Than writes that this has led some scientists to 
believe that Neanderthals are not a distinct species, but rather a specific European race of Homo sapiens. 
The possible incorrectness of Bataille’s anthropological claim does not endanger our project. The 
philosophical question posed as to what it means to be a human subject remains unhindered. 
Interestingly though, this alleged Neanderthal art does not depict the animalistic figures of the Lascaux 
caves. To the contrary, these cave paintings are merely of hand stencils and geometric figures. If the 
Neanderthals are indeed a distinct species, then a comparative analysis of Neanderthal art to that of 
Homo sapien art might add to Bataille’s endeavor.  
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 This separation of human being from animal lies in their respective relations to 
subjective experience. Although Bataille rarely uses the term “subject” directly, it is easy 
to draw such a term out of his work, as does his editor/translator, Stuart Kendall. In the 
editor’s introduction, “The Sediment of the Possible,” Kendall writes “The passage from 
animal to man [for Bataille] announces the birth of the subject” (Kendall 16). This 
passage out of animality and into humanity is one that is founded on the explosion of art, 
of which the Lascaux paintings are an exemplary instance. For Bataille’s project, as well 
as the current one, it is key that Bataille be interpreted thusly. The production and 
creation of artwork is that which separates the human being from the rest of the animal 
kingdom. The ability to create artwork is the reflection of a particular experience that was 
beginning to flesh itself out in the prehistoric human being.  Kendall writes that Bataille’s 
prehistory “is the beginning of a history that includes us; it is, [Bataille] believes, our 
history, our culture. Prehistory is the key to history because it ‘announces the subject, the 
‘I,’ it announces ‘us’” (16). Prehistory is the moment, a moment that lasted several 
millennia, in which the wealth, depth, and subjectivity of the modern human experience 
began to take root. Prehistoric art is the reflection of this experience, an integral part of 
the experience itself, and that which separates the Homo sapien from the animal. Art 
separates the human from the animal even when the animal is the figurative subject of the 
artist.
16
  
                                                          
16
 Later this point will be expanded upon in relation to the modern experience of madness. Throughout 
the Renaissance and in the early part of The Classical Age, Foucault writes that the mad were often feared 
for having recourse to their fundamental animality. Much later, in the 19
th
 century as the mad produced 
the work of art, and madness once more becomes the subject of the work of art, the mad must show 
themselves as something other than the animal and become reflective of the truth of man. If Foucault’s 
work and Bataille’s work are to be reconciled, then the madman and the work of art he produces are 
either: 1.) necessary sides of a coin, and clearly such a coin can never land on both sides at once. 2.) 
simultaneously existent/co-dependent, but separated by status, with madness as the subject of art and 
art as the object of madness. This may then reveal a dialectic between the subject/object. 
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In artwork, the human rises to a plain of being and reflects a mode of existence 
that is seemingly beyond that of any animal. It is not hard to understand, then, the sense 
of pride that the human being, as the maker of art, i.e., as the conscious, creative subject, 
had in his own work and subsequently in his ability to know and create. In one of 
Bataille’s most overtly Nietzschean passages he praises the greatness of prehistoric man 
and his excess in art:  
 
The first step when humanity emerged from the interminable winter of the 
earliest times was the most confident, the most worthy of admiration. In 
the hands of these men, who created art, who strayed from an empty past, 
there was a virtue comparable to the most accomplished hands of today. 
(158) 
 
Bataille’s high praise of the fairly rudimentary cave artwork may seem excessive at first, 
especially when put on par with some of The Classical Age’s technically astounding 
works of art. However, when contextualized in both its space within the darkness of its 
cave, as well as its position at the dawn of humanity, one is hard pressed to find more 
awe-inspiring works of art then those present at the Lascaux cave. One must also note the 
stunning representation of the animal in the artwork, or more specifically, the importance 
placed on that which is close to the human, but simultaneously clearly distinguishable 
from the human, that is, the animal. This attachment to the representation of the animal 
shows the formation of the human subject in a way that is more specific than the simple 
production of artwork. Self-awareness, the formation of the collective, and the formation 
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of the individual subject, rise to new levels when one is able to create a negative 
definition of oneself in such a manner. Whether or not the reinforcement and 
establishment of subjectivity in the human being was the purpose of the cave painting for 
prehistoric man is irrelevant.
17
 It was the fulfillment of a need as well as that which 
(perhaps unintentionally) led to the development of consciousness and the subject. The 
subject was that which was formed and established in congruence with art, whether or not 
this was considered as such at the time.  
 In fact, one could interpret Bataille in a way that shows the subjective experience 
as that which is available and vague before the work of art, and also as that which 
becomes definite and rigorous after the work of art. Bataille writes at length upon various 
theories on the use of the cave paintings to the ancient people, and for Bataille these 
paintings are tied to a religious instinct and wild passion. The cave paintings were used 
for the apparition of the animal spirit, to conjure up something greater, that is, something 
beyond the apparent world. Through the cave painting the prehistoric human was able to 
create something spiritual, otherworldly, and magical, essentially something religious. 
Cave art, especially in its figuration of animals, served a religious function, and is thereby 
the embodiment of a deep human subjective experience: the impulse to religion and 
magic.  Bataille writes that “At the very heart of existence, we find a kind of chaos, a 
gaping void perhaps, which conceals a chaotic delirium. At the heart of existence, we 
find art, and we find poetry, and we find a multitude of religions” (121). Thus religion, in 
its association with “gaping voids” and “chaotic delirium” shows itself to be extremely 
subjective, as does the very nature of chaos, a chaos rooted at the “very heart of 
                                                          
17
 Bataille writes that these paintings may have not even been considered “works of art” by early Homo 
sapiens and that they quite possibly were believed to hold magical and religious powers that could 
summon the animal. 
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existence” (121). Homo sapiens therefore had some sort of subjective experience brought 
to them through the impulse to religion, but this does not yet mean the human subject is 
itself established. Though subjectivity might be at the heart of existence, that does not yet 
prove the existence of the individual subject. As Nietzsche promptly put it, “There were 
eternities during which [the human intellect] did not exist,” and yet this does not mean 
that the chaos of the universe wasn’t already within every embodied being (Nietzsche 
114).  
 This internal chaos, already known to the human being, might cause a deep 
discomfort and fear. There is nothing of which to grab hold, no stability or truth to 
partake in. This discomfort/fear might be the reason Bataille finds poetry, art, and 
religion present alongside chaos in the human experience. These reflect this chaos, but 
also show the attempt of the human being to establish herself as a subject, and therefore 
in opposition to the chaos that is being. Through making the animal the object of one’s 
art, then one establishes oneself in opposition to the animal, creating a separation 
between human and animal that was previously unknown. The human being is therefore 
negatively created. Human experience is emptiness/void/nothingness constituted by that 
which it is not. In order for that subjectivity to become the individual subject, then that 
subject must define himself by that which he is in opposition to. He must look upon the 
other as other, forging his own subjective experience through the objectification of that 
which he is distinguishable from.
18
 For the pre-historic people, this was the animal. 
                                                          
18 As we will soon see, Bataille does not believe that the original religious “conjuring” of the animal had 
anything to do with objectification, but rather spiritual apparition. However, this does not mean that 
objectification was not an unintended consequence the artwork. Though the art may have had a religious 
function, it also functions independently as a representation of the animal and therefore reflects the 
conscious awareness in the human of the animal as something other.  Bataille sees the extreme 
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Perhaps in the Classical Age this was the madman. In the creation of art/religion, the 
nothingness that is the human being takes pride in its ability to make itself into a 
something, i.e., a subject.  
Before cave art, the human being felt the power of the chaotic subjectivity of the 
universe within herself (in the impulse to magic), but after such art, she found within 
herself a power that was distinctly her own, that is, the ability to make apparitions appear. 
It is in the moment of artistic endeavor, or perhaps more specifically, the conjuring of 
spirits, that the transformation from animal (general participant in the subjective world) 
to human (specific/individual subject) occurs, and is birthed from power and pride in 
power.
19
 Bataille writes the following: 
 
Specifically, the apparition of the animal was not, to the man who 
astonished himself by making it appear, the apparition of a definable 
object, like the apparition of a definable object…That which appeared had 
at first a significance that was scarcely accessible, beyond what could have 
been defined. Precisely this equivocal, indefinable meaning was religious. 
(135) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
objectification of the animal by the modern man, to a degree that far surpasses whatever could have 
been the case for the mystic/religious prehistoric man: “Modern man’s gaze in regard to animals, his gaze 
in general, distinct from individual reactions, the gaze with which we see them, is an empty stare: it is the 
same gaze that sees useful things and any other random object” (75). 
19
 Perhaps it is needless to say that this power, and the pride that results from such power, is the result of 
the physiognomy and dexterity of the Homo sapiens. Bipedalism allowed for the greater use and 
development of the hands, the primary instrument used in the creation of the cave paintings. 
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Firstly, this passage shows the possible strength of the religious intuitions of the ancient 
person, but secondly, and perhaps more importantly for our project, it shows the way in 
which man was astonished by himself, i.e., man was amazed by his own power to conjure 
up an inaccessible “beyond.” Humanity realized in this affect its own capacity to create 
spirit, and thus we imbue ourselves with the spirit of creation. “Man had the power to 
make them [animals] appear at will and to make them appear for fun” (135).20 This enters 
the human being into a distinctly powerful position among the creatures of Earth. The 
human being is religious, the only religious creature, and he is so “to the extent that he 
understands that he is” (138). For Bataille, the human being is religious only through 
understanding, but this does not mean that religiosity is derived from 
understanding/intelligence. Perhaps it is human understanding that births the drive for 
religion and magic because the human is the creature that feels the chaos of the world. 
Religion and magic are in themselves the negation of understanding/intelligence, since 
they are necessarily un-interpretable and ungraspable. However, they are also only 
available in a creature that can understand. This magical feeling grows as the 
understanding grows, even if it is the negation of the understanding. Bataille proposes a 
definition of religion, but it is one that is essentially negative, as religion itself is 
undefinable. In defining religion one contradicts oneself because religion is indefinable. 
One attempts to objectify an essentially subjective experience and thusly alienates oneself 
from that experience, and yet the greater one understands the world, the more susceptible 
one will be to the religious experience. This will be of great importance in the coming 
discussions of Nietzsche, a man at the end of the intellectual rope and simultaneously 
stretched to an affective, prophetic grandiosity.  
                                                          
20
 The emphasis on “at will” is my own.  
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 In the artwork of the earliest human beings much light is shed about the earliest 
human experiences: 1.) the impulse to religion 2.) the understanding of the chaos 3.) the 
negation of understanding through religion 4.) artwork as a site for the simultaneity of 
religion and understanding 5.) the birth of the subject in this simultaneous experience 6.) 
the pride taken in the understanding of the religious/artistic experience, that is, the pride 
of the subject. 
 Nietzsche and the Ancient Greeks will take us to the limits of this pride and 
uncover the beginnings of the human as object, which, one could claim, is already present 
in the birth of Bataille’s human subject, albeit negatively.  However, in Ancient Greek 
culture, objectification reaches a new height, one which might be considered a decisive 
turning point in the history of human experience, a point at which humanity becomes 
“mad for logic” (Nietzsche 9).  
 Over the course of The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche describes the rise and fall of an 
art form he considered of the upmost greatness, i.e., the Greek tragedy. The tragedy 
combined the “Dionsyiac” and “Apollonian” aspects of Greek culture/experience to 
create a performance reflective of the power of illusion, as well as the depth of a 
cultivated subjective experience as it is paired with a joyful acceptance of life.
21
 As we 
discussed above, in Bataille’s case, religion/mysticism functioned only in relation to 
understanding, but simultaneously as the negation of that understand. This reaffirms the 
notion that understanding/knowledge can only be obtained through a negative 
relationship. In this discussion of Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy we will see the way in 
                                                          
21
 The Dionsyiac elements reflect a universal, eternal, musical, invisible connection that unites all 
collectively, while the Apollonian elements are plastic, visible, definite, individual/particular, and reflect 
the apparent nature of things. While the depth of this experience/distinction is fascinating in its own 
right, it is tangential to the object at hand, that is, the conflict between the Socratic and Dionysiac Greek 
natures.  
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which the end of the Greek tragedy, that is, its suicide, is reflective of the understanding’s 
attempt to constitute itself in a more rigorous, objective sense. The rise of Socrates and 
Post-Socratic Greek philosophy marks an era in which knowledge/understanding 
becomes the only true/absolute virtue. The subjective experience is thusly diminished 
insofar as it becomes the object of philosophy’s gaze. It is no longer experienced as the 
phenomenon/sensation that it is in itself. Philosophy conquers the tragedy, the artist, and 
reconstitutes society in favor of the wise.  
 Nietzsche believes that the Greek tragedy, unlike previous art forms, died by 
suicide. This suicide at the hands of the famed playwright, Euripides, transformed much 
of the Dionsyiac elements of the tragedy into more reasonable, understandable Socratic 
elements. Euripides, writes Nietzsche, was a “troubled spectator” (Nietzsche 75). He did 
not understand the works of his great precursors, Aeschylus and Sophocles. For 
Nietzsche’s Euripides, the Dionsyiac tragedies, filled with mystery, pomp, inane 
misfortunes, and ambiguous moral outcomes, were puzzles to be solved (75). Euripides 
was concerned with his spectators and wanted to present a work of clarity, truth, and 
reason. There were two spectators specifically that Nietzsche claims Euripides concerned 
himself with, and it was the specificity of these concerns that led him to turn the Greek 
tragedy on its head. The first of these two spectators was Euripides himself, “the thinker 
Euripides, not the poet” (74).  Euripides the thinker “looked upon reason as the 
fountainhead of all doing and enjoying” (75). For this reason, the inanity and ambiguity 
of the former Greek playwrights must have been very upsetting, a fault to overcome for 
future playwrights like himself. When one pairs this attitude of concern for the spectator 
with such an obsession for reason, one allows the audience to judge the action occurring 
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on the stage and forces said action into an agreement with that which the audience finds 
sensible and understandable. The spectator cannot spurn the tragedy that he/she 
understands.  Euripides intention is now revealed: “it is to eliminate from tragedy the 
primitive and pervasive Dionsyiac element, and to rebuild drama on a foundation of non-
Dionsyiac art, custom and philosophy” (76).  
 For Euripides, then, it is important to find a worthy, reasonable spectator beyond 
himself. The second spectator, according to Nietzsche, is the one “who did not 
understand tragedy and therefore spurned it” (75). The one that spurns tragedy because it 
is not understandable must then assume that that which is good, useful, or likable must 
also be that which is understandable, i.e., rational. Anything that is otherwise ought to be 
corrected or cast aside. Euripides needed to convert this spectator to tragedy, and in this 
process he had to apply some essential changes to the tragedy. The name Nietzsche gives 
to this second spectator, this lord of reason, should ring familiar: Socrates. It is in 
Socrates and the heights of human wisdom, in the great virtue of knowledge, to which 
Euripides looks for his second spectator. Socrates becomes the reason for Euripides’ 
dramas, and, as Nietzsche puts it, Euripides becomes the first practitioner of “esthetic 
Socratism” (79). In fact, Nietzsche reports that “Socrates, being a sworn enemy of the 
tragic arts, is said never to have attended the theater except when a new play of Euripides 
was mounted” (83).  
 Socrates appreciated that which was understandable, moral, and clear. These two 
spectators, Euripides and Socrates, are the ones who actively reflect on the tragedy but 
end their viewing without any understanding of said tragedy. The pomp of Euripides’ 
predecessors was something that Euripides could not understand. All that was showy and 
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musical wasn’t understood, couldn’t be understood, and therefore spurned by Euripides, 
as evinced by its absence from his own tragedies. His tragedies thus lost the Dionysian 
spirit that was the father of the tragedy. They sought to understand that which could not 
be understood, therefore misunderstanding and losing Dionysus. Thusly the tragedy dies 
in its own self-reflection, lost as the object of its own gaze. In other words, it suffered 
suicide by objectification. This is objectification brought on by the rise of philosophy, 
specifically by the wisdom of Socrates.  
 Before moving from a discussion of the death of Greek tragedy to a more general 
discussion of the rise of objectification and philosophy in Ancient Greece, it is important 
to note the way in which this transition in Greek theater impacts the subjective human 
experience, especially as it is portrayed through art. Bataille saw cave paintings and the 
objectification of the animal in a work of art as a reflection of the foundations of human 
subjectivity, an unconscious process towards greater human experience. Nietzsche sees 
the heights of the Greek tragedy as the greatest accomplishment and reflection of human 
subjectivity thus far. One could hypothesize that human subjective rose throughout the 
ages, from the Lascaux caves until the height of Dionysian experience in the Ancient 
Greek tragedy.
22
  
Nietzsche stresses that the works made by Euripides’ precursor, Aeschylus, were 
unconscious works of art, thus reflecting the great Dionysian spirit and the essential 
irrationality underlying the human experience. Nietzsche writes:  
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  As was noted earlier, Nietzsche believes that the Greek tragedy died at its own hands, in an attempt to 
make that which was unconscious and artistic about the tragedy part of a conscious awakening. 
Essentially, this could be read as the moment at which subjectivity, in its greatest excess, reaches its limits 
and is eclipsed by objectivity. We will see later that objectivity dies by its own sword as well at the end of 
the Age of Enlightenment and on into the 19
th
 century. The deaths of both subjectivity and objectivity, 
along with their resurrections in the death of the other, are key ingredients to an understanding of the 
modern human experience, forever at the limits of both, constantly alienated.  
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Euripides would never have endorsed Sophocles statement about 
Aeschylus: that he was doing the right thing but unconsciously; instead he 
would have claimed that since Aeschylus created unconsciously he 
couldn’t help doing the wrong thing…his esthetic axiom ‘whatever is to 
be beautiful must be conscious’ is strictly parallel to the Socratic 
‘whatever is to be good must be conscious.’ (81) 
 
 The eclipse of the artistic, Dionysian, and unconscious in the Greek tragedy 
coincides with the rise of Greek philosophy and the Socratic way of thinking. The values 
of society shifted and “true” knowledge (objective understanding) was posited as an 
ultimate good. Knowledge resided in transparency, clarity, and consciousness. Socrates, 
according to Nietzsche, was not deemed the wisest man by the Delphic oracle because of 
his wealth of knowledge, but because of his awareness, that is, specifically, his 
awareness of his lack of knowledge (83).
23
 Socrates is wise, not in virtue of knowledge 
itself, but in his understanding of his own knowledge, in his self-reflection. The sophists, 
politicians, and poets of the day couldn’t compete with Socrates in this regard. They were 
full of false knowledge and pretensions, led by their instincts rather than reason. Socrates, 
on the other hand, was born of a different grain. He was to usher in a new era, one ready 
for philosophy, science, truth, and wisdom. These new values would essentially eclipse 
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 Interestingly, Nietzsche notes that Euripides was pronounced the second wisest. “The third place went 
to Sophocles, who had boasted that, in contrast to Aeschylus, he not only did the right thing but knew 
why. Evidently it was the transparency of their knowledge that earned for these three men the reputation 
of true wisdom in their day” (83).  This reflects the close ties between Socrates and Euripides as well as 
the importance placed on conscious understanding.  
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the artistic, unconscious experience of the Greek tragedy. According to Nietzsche, 
Socrates was to be the first of a new breed, the first theoretical man.
24
 
 The theoretical person is the one whom revels in the knowledge of the revealed 
and thusly distinguishes herself from the artistic person. Both the artistic person and the 
theoretical person take “infinite pleasure in all that exists” and are thereby saved from 
pessimism/nihilism, a disillusion with life, a destructive tendency against existence (92). 
However, there is an essential difference in the affections of the theoretical person and 
the artistic person. The theoretical person takes her pleasure in the endless uncovering of 
new objects as they are exposed through artistic revelation. She derives her pleasure from 
the understanding, observation, and interrogation of that which has already been revealed, 
as well as the process of revelation itself. The artistic person, on the other hand, is the one 
through whom the revelation is made. This person is not concerned with the act of 
revelation but rather the act of creation through the navigation of, and submergence in, 
unconscious waters. In other words, the artistic person functions as a discoverer and 
searcher of unconscious depths while the theoretical person focuses her gaze upon the 
revealed, taking an interest in the mechanistic functioning of the object. The artistic 
person reveals more of the unconscious for conscious pondering, which the theoretical 
person quickly engages in. Viewed as such a process, it must necessarily be the 
unconscious, artistic, subjective drive/desire that rises first in human history. The 
theoretical person works with the tools given to her by the artistic person. This 
unconscious, artistic drive may have been at work from the time of the pre-historics until 
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 As is the case with Bataille’s cave art, (esp. the Lascaux Cave) nothing hinges upon Socrates the man 
being the first instance of this new mode of being. Rather he should be thought of as the figurehead 
which functions as the symbolic representation of a general trend toward a new mode of being. 
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its climactic suicide in Greek tragedy. It is only under such conditions that a sober 
disposition such as that of Socrates is able to arise. 
Nietzsche explains the distinction between the theoretical and artistic persons in 
more elegant terms: “while the artist, having unveiled the truth garment by garment, 
remains with his gaze fixed on what is still hidden, theoretical man takes delight in the 
cast garments” (92).  The theoretical person explains, i.e., objectifies, what the artistic 
person has revealed and created.  One reveals the nature of the human experience while 
the other explains this experience. In this explanation and scientific obsession, we are 
able to view the Socratic/theoretical person as much more than the negation of the 
Dionysian/artistic person. They become sides of a coin, negating/hiding one another but 
always secretly dependent upon the other, though the Socratic may be more dependent on 
the Dionysian than vice versa.
25
 The judge must be given something upon which to gaze, 
but the object of the gaze need not necessarily be gazed upon.  
Now, in the grander scheme of this essay, it becomes necessary to elucidate the 
objectifying powers of the theoretical person. Nietzsche writes that “…we must now ask, 
‘Toward what does a figure like Socrates point?’ Faced with the evidence of the Platonic 
dialogues, we are certainly not entitled to see in Socrates merely an agent of 
disintegration” (89).  Though, as we have seen, Socrates was the destroyer of the Greek 
tragedy, we have also seen that, as the theoretical man, he represents an endless love for 
the revealed mechanisms of the world. In this optimistic obsession with that which has 
been revealed, with the science of things, the theoretical person acts as a human logic 
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 The theoretical/Socratic person is absolutely dependent upon the artistic because it need the artistic in 
order to have something unveiled for it to gaze upon. While the artistic might be able to explore the 
unconscious in a more robust fashion due to the product of theoretical labor and technical ability, it 
remains autonomous in its ability to create of its own accord.  
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machine, forming patterns and creating order from out of the chaos, a chaos revealed by 
the artist. Nietzsche repeats Anaxagoras, stating, “’In the beginning all things were mixed 
together; then reason came and introduced order’” (81).26 In other words, the theoretical 
man takes the chaotic mess given to him by the artistic man and attempts to apply 
structure to it, organizing systems of knowledge in philosophies and sciences. The 
positive, perhaps “creative,” power of the Socratic person is in this organizing, system-
building tendency. The scientist forms models/paradigms to explain the processes of the 
nature world, while the philosopher establishes cohesive systems of thought. Scientific 
paradigms are often tossed aside as new data suggests a more, robust/powerful paradigm. 
Western philosophy has progressed in the same manner, albeit in a less linear fashion, as 
philosophers reject and advance upon the ideas of their predecessors and contemporaries.  
So, in answer to the question, “towards what does greater strength in theoretical 
thinking, i.e., in the Socratic spirit, point?” we may say a more intensive, robust, 
scientifically verifiable, objective, paradigmatic worldview. Objective, rational 
knowledge of “the world” continually increases as science advances/progresses. The next 
question one may ask is as follows: what happens to the 
subjective/artistic/creative/irrational side of humanity when objectivity/rationality 
increases, dominating the spirit of the human race? In other words, what comes of our 
affective situation and propensity for subjective experience? Nietzsche writes “only by 
forgetting that he himself is an artistically creating subject, does man live with any 
repose, security, and consistency” (119). Is it the case, then, that subjective experience 
                                                          
26
 Anaxagoras (5
th
 century B.C.E.) was a Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher famous for stating that nous, that 
is, the mind /the intellect, is the cause of the universe. 
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must suffer at the hands of objective, deceptive rationality?
27
 Nietzsche’s primary 
concern in The Birth of Tragedy seems to be the reclamation of the Dionysian spirit, a 
spirit that lives without repose, security, or consistency, as the Socratic spirit does. 
Therefore, the question as to whether Dionysus can exist in a Socratic world becomes a 
pressing one: 
 
What concerns us here is the question whether those powers to whose 
influence Greek tragedy succumbed will maintain their ascendency 
permanently, thereby blocking for good the renascence of tragedy and the 
tragic world view. The fact that the dialectical drive toward knowledge 
and scientific optimism has succeeded in turning tragedy from its course 
suggests that there may be an eternal conflict between the theoretical and 
the tragic world view, in which case tragedy could be reborn only when 
science had at last been pushed to its limits and, faced with those limits, 
been forced to renounce its claim to universal validity. For the new 
hypothetical tragedy the music-practicing Socrates might be a fitting 
symbol. (Nietzsche 104-105) 
 
                                                          
27
 I use the term “deceptive” here for its correspondence to Nietzsche’s “forgetting.” Nietzsche believes 
that it is only by deceiving ourselves, i.e., lying to ourselves, that we are capable of functioning and 
forming conceptual/abstract frameworks. Much of this comes through the “forgetting” of the deep 
subjectivity that underlies human experience, a subjectivity of which the Greek Tragedians were so aware. 
The Socratic/theoretical person has forgotten his/her subjectivity (at least, in part), and it is only through 
this that he/she is able to build paradigms/systems in sciences and philosophies. Nietzsche elaborates on 
this point in his essay, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” a work that I will refer to more 
extensively in the next chapter.  
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 The key points in this selection that will be useful for a wider analysis include 
firstly, the identification of the limit and secondly, the musical Socrates. The limits of 
theoretical and scientific man, that is, the limits of the Socratic spirit, are the boundaries 
within which that spirit can exist without collapsing upon itself. By this Nietzsche means 
that there are extents to which science, theory and reason can exist before reaching a 
turning point. At this point the Socratic practitioner of science/philosophy realizes that 
there is a deep unreason that underlies all their reason. This is already evident in Kant 
(something that Nietzsche makes note of in The Birth of Tragedy) in his claim that there 
are things that are beyond human reason. He reaches this conclusion through the absolute 
application of reason and thereby shows the extent, that is, the limit, of such reason. The 
Socratic man thereby collapses in on itself.  In order for this limit to be reached, it is clear 
that the Socratic man must be pushed to this limit. This should not be a problem due to 
the inherent investigative nature of the Socratic spirit. The theoretical person will always 
be pushing the limits and extending his/her knowledge, gazing deeper into the nature of 
things. 
The “great” theoretical person expresses what Foucault calls “the will to 
knowledge,” a concept he employs directly in his later work, The History of Sexuality, 
Vol. 1. The will to knowledge, as the name suggests, is a drive to know, understand, and 
establish truth, precisely the qualities within the theoretical person. Strengthening the will 
to knowledge will push the Socratic/theoretical person to her limits and open the door to 
the abyss. In a sense, this means that the Socratic person reaches a cliff, i.e., a breaking 
point. She overlooks this aforementioned cliff and sees nothing but the senseless, endless, 
eternal, universal abyss that is already realized, however naively or unconsciously, by the 
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tragic/Dionysian spirit. Nietzsche’s assumption is that, at some point, the Socratic spirit 
will recognize its own limit instead of pressing onward. Instead of remaining with a fixed 
gaze on forms and concepts, the philosopher will find that “truths are illusions which we 
have forgotten are illusions” and nothing more (Nietzsche 117).28 
  The second important point, which reflects Nietzsche’s paradoxical optimism 
toward the coming/reawakening of tragedy, is the possibility of a spirit that is 
simultaneously theoretical/scientific and tragic/Dionysian, i.e., “the music-practicing 
Socrates” (105). This appears as though it could only be the case if there is not an 
“eternal conflict between the theoretical and tragic world view” (104). There is the 
possibility of a completely new worldview, one both theoretical and tragic, one of both 
the will to knowledge (along with the recognition of the fallibility of knowledge in the 
face of the universal (Socrates)), as well as one that wishes to artistically create, drunk on 
the excess of life (Dionysus). This new end of the theoretical person would be one that 
embraces the illusion of knowledge, i.e., the appearance of things (Apollo).  Nietzsche 
sees the potential for a new tragedy after the limits of Socratism have been reached, 
tragedy that combines the Socratic with the Apollonian and the Dionysian spirit. It holds 
a conscious embracement of the unconscious, and a delight in the illusion of knowledge. 
This delight is in both the illusion of knowledge and knowledge of illusion.  It embraces 
the Apollonian world of appearance and Dionysian world beyond. It can achieve this 
through an understanding of the illusion as well as comprehending the illusion as illusion.  
                                                          
28
 It could be argued that the Socratic philosophers, e.g., Kant and Schopenhauer, recognized this limit, 
but that the Socratic scientists have not yet done so. There is, therefore, a gap between the new tragic 
spirit in philosophy and a growing Socratism outside of this realm. The disparity between wisdom and 
scientific knowledge may be much wider than it ever has been. While in ancient times philosophic and 
scientific pursuits were often of the same ends, and carried out by the same people, in modern times the 
rigor of specialization has forced a divide in the Socratic spirit.  
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This optimism in the individual realized as object and subject, as Socrates and 
Dionysus, lent to us by Nietzsche, might be the very key to analyzing Friedrich Nietzsche 
himself, the writer and the madman. The convergence of the Socratic and Dionysian 
worldviews, of philosopher and artist, is expressed in Nietzsche’s work. He is the 
philosopher (theoretical/scientific) whom embraces the limits of philosophy, explored 
those limits and exposed them as limits. To better understand the “limits” that Nietzsche 
reflects, and the historical specificity of the milieu in which his philosophy/art was 
birthed, we must turn to Foucault. In his analysis of madness in the 19
th
 century we will 
find the simultaneity of the subjective and objective sides of the human experience as 
they encounter the cliff. 
 The objectifying process might have taken historical flight with the advent of the 
Socratic man and a new philosophical form of thought in Ancient Greece, but it is not 
until the 19
th
 century that the brute strength of objectivity turned its gaze on the human 
being, especially in the mad. Foucault, in his description of the perception of general 
paralysis, details this objectifying force as one that coincides with the increased scientific 
rigor of the age. By the 19
th
 century, medicine had, in large part, become a dominant 
avenue for the treatment of the mad, thereby “hiding its moral accusations behind the 
objectivity of observations” (523). The treatment of the mad, their repression, their 
separation/seclusion from the rest of society, could no longer be viewed from the more 
apparent moral condemnation of madness. It now became an objective, scientific 
imperative. The seclusion in the asylum was interpreted as an objective necessity, not a 
debatable moral requirement. As a result of this medical objectification, the guilt infused 
in the mad became the guilt of an object, guilt more liberal/forgiving in appearance and 
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intention, but all the more sinister in consequence.
29
 While the guilt in madness was lifted 
off the subject, it was simultaneously infused onto the object. Troublingly, and 
paradoxically, the subject and object occupy the same space, and are then necessarily the 
same. Therefore any objectification of the human being is also a subjectification, one in 
which the subject becomes the hidden shadow of the object. From the objective medical 
gaze, responsibility was taken off the human being and placed on the physical organism, 
that is, the object. The distinction between human being and Homo sapien, which we 
briefly tackled in the study of Bataille (outlined above), once again becomes useful.  
The movement in Foucault’s 19th century is in distinct opposition to Bataille’s 
birth of humanity with the creation of prehistoric art. While Bataille saw (in the instance 
of artistic representation) the human being birthed from the artistic/religious impulse of 
the Homo sapien, Foucault found the reemergence of the human being as object, i.e., as 
Homo sapien, in the scientific will to knowledge with its objective gaze turned upon 
itself. The human being looked upon itself, in the depths of its subjectivity in madness, 
and studied itself as object. The science of psychology and the attempt to “know thyself” 
(through the negative process of understanding the other, i.e., the madman) alienated the 
person from herself, making her both the gazer (the scientist/objectifier) and the gazed 
(the object/subject). The unfortunate result was to be nothing other than the perception of 
the madman as an object, completely stripped of subjectivity and forced into the role of a 
                                                          
29
 Though tangential to the focus of this essay, it is important to recognize that in Foucault’s writing one 
can find historical systems/structures of thought/practice that had the best of intentions (or at the least 
appealed to a more liberal human disposition), but resulted in unfortunate consequences. Foucault never 
makes such normative statements in his work, but lets the consequence speak for itself. In this case, an 
attempt to rectify the “problem of madness,” that is, return the victim to health and preserve the safety 
of society through the victim’s quarantine, resulted in the objectification of the victim/madman and the 
alienation of this person from his/her experience. The subjective experience was compromised/martyred 
for the safety of the norm.  
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medical/psychiatric tool. For Foucault, the modern human being is the first human being 
to be subject. One becomes subject (and object) through the objectifying force of the will 
to knowledge. In becoming the subject, one’s individual subjectivity is analyzed through 
an objective lens. In other words, there is an objective nature to the subject and that 
subject’s self-expression, that is, her subjectivity. This is distinguishable from the general 
subjective experience outlined by both Nietzsche and Bataille, an experience of 
metaphysical solace with one’s position in a subjective, intoxicated world. Foucault finds 
no such metaphysical solace for the self-alienated, modern human being. Thusly, 
Foucault does not concern himself with metaphysical questions. Instead he focuses on the 
particular human experience at a particular time in a particular milieu. This method is 
employed in order to gain an understanding of the type of experiences bred from different 
manifestations of society and its institutions/structures.  
 Thusly, this movement from the responsibility of the subject to that of the object 
(discussed above) is a reflection of a reversal in the human being’s relation to the world 
as a function of the milieu. Foucault finds that in the 19
th
 century the scientific 
culture/institution resulted in the destruction of a distinction between the internal and the 
external in the human experience. Foucault writes: 
 
Now all madness, and madness in its entirety, were to have an external 
equivalent; or rather, the very essence of madness was to turn men into 
objects, chasing them to the outside of themselves, ultimately reducing 
them to the level of a nature pure and simple, to the level of things.
30
 (524)  
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 A more detailed discussion of the resulting sense of alienation that is captured by this objectification 
can be found in Ch. 1. As the mad are chased “outside of themselves” they are then, separated from 
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One of the many striking things about this passage is the pairing of “pure nature” with a 
new relationship to the external. If one is to be “reduced” to nature, and one’s internality 
is powered by the external, then one could suppose that one’s nature is anti-natural, 
blank, empty, void, etc. In other words, one’s “nature,” one’s internal being, is a chasm. 
One becomes what one is only through interaction with that which one isn’t, that is, the 
other. This, as is investigated more thoroughly in Ch. 1, reveals the way in which the 
truth of madness, as it is shown through its objectification, exposes the general truth of 
the human being, i.e., the lack of truth, our fundamental exteriority. One’s subjectivity is 
one’s objectivity. One’s interiority and nature is constituted only through the objectifying 
gaze with which one forms truths in the world. When this gaze holds the same position as 
the object gazed upon, i.e., the human being, the truth of man is uncovered. The anti-
natural nature is brought to light.  
 Foucault makes evident in “The Anthropological Circle” that this “essential 
moment of objectification” is revealed only in that which is other to the normal gaze, that 
is, in madness (525). It is madness that portrays the human subjective experience as 
objective. It only proves said experience by being gazed upon by that which it constitutes 
and by its other-ness. For instance, Foucault discusses a specific type of madness 
prevalent in the 19
th
 century discourse known as moral insanity. The victims of moral 
insanity had a “’disorder in their action’” (524). “Moral insanity” corresponded with a 
spontaneous action for which no reason could be given. The morally insane manifested 
their illness only in action, not in substance. There was no interior cause or motive behind 
                                                                                                                                                                             
themselves, i.e., alienated. This shows that the subjective experience is not destroyed in objectification; 
rather, it is repressed and hidden. 
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the action. The insanity was only manifest in its exterior manifestation. This was the 
closest form of mental illness to the root “truth” Foucault extracts from the 19th century 
experience of madness. Insanity proper, “the spontaneous psychologization of man,” was 
exemplified through the morally insane. The spontaneity, or suddenness of which 
Foucault speaks, is of the moment in which the inner subjectivity is expressed external as 
objective. Inner subjectivity becomes visible and realizable only through its outward 
expression. The truth of human subjectivity in the modern period is, then, revealed by 
objectification, by the mechanistic, goal-oriented, objectivity of will.  
 Moral insanity showed the necessity of madness as other for the perception of the 
truth of human subjectivity in the 19
th
 century: 
 
…It (moral insanity) showed at a perceptible level, bodies, modes of 
behavior, mechanisms and objects, the inaccessible moment of 
subjectivity, and just as that subjective moment could only have a concrete 
existence for knowledge in objectivity, that objectivity could only be 
acceptable and have meaning through what it expressed of the subject. 
(525) 
 
In other words, the only way that the search for the truth of subjectivity could be 
expressed is through objective knowledge. However, this objective knowledge could only 
be expressed through the subject. On both sides of this dialectic one must be made other 
to oneself only to reaffirm oneself. The spontaneity of moral insanity is relevant in this 
discussion because it reflects the sudden transference from subjective, interior experience 
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to objective, exterior reality. It is in this instant, and its reversal in the psychologisation 
of this instant, that the modern human subject/object is formed. 
The human being, as subject and object, only comes into being in the modern era 
as the object of its own gaze. Here it is important to note that this does not necessarily 
dispute the accounts given by George Bataille and Friedrich Nietzsche, though nothing 
necessarily hinges on a reconciliation amongst these genealogists. The human subjective 
experience could be in existence since the time of the Lascaux cave paintings and 
prehistoric religion without there yet being a human subject. Similarly, the radical 
objectivity of the scientific/Socratic man may have sparked to life in Ancient Greece 
without there yet being a conception of the human as object. It is only once this objective 
gaze is turned back upon the human being, i.e., his/her subjectivity, that the human being 
becomes subject/object. This element did not come to fruition until the rising 
psychologisation of the human being in the 19
th
 century. In fact, it is necessary for 
subjectivity and objectivity to exist in order for the subject/object to exist.  The objective 
gaze looks upon the subjective experience, thereby making it an object and that objective 
truth the subject.  
As has been noted above, and at length in the preceding chapter, this simultaneity 
of subjective/objective experience in the modern human being has caused a degree of 
self-alienation. In becoming the self-reflective object of one’s own gaze one becomes 
other to one’s self. This internal alienation, revealed in the terror of madness, the end of 
liberty in its objectification, and the chaos of the madman’s language, could be the cause 
of great internal strife. The politics of the self and the investigation into this internal 
alienation in the modern period were of the highest importance to Michel Foucault. 
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Though he rarely offers any normative statements or prescriptive remarks in his writing, 
there are moments, brief passages, and sparks of light that hint at his passionate 
underlying idealism. The final pages of “The Anthropological Circle” may provide some 
insight into how one may cope with, and affirm, the self-alienation of the modern human 
subject. In the following chapter we will foray into a possible prescription for, and 
affirmation of, self-alienation. Insight into the deep, subjective human experience can 
manifest itself in innumerable folds. One avenue of discovery (and darkness) that all 
three philosophers embrace and reflect is that of artistic creation. Perhaps there is a way 
in which one’s aesthetic experience, critically engaged, can strengthen, and affirm, one’s 
status in the modern age as subject/object.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
TOWARD THE INFINITE, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: 
IMPLICATIONS OF MADNESS AND THE OUEVRE 
 
Foucault’s hostility towards stagnant views of human nature and subjective 
experience is well documented throughout his corpus.  The anti-natural nature of human 
experience, as it is elucidated by the internal/external dialectic and the subsequent 
formation of the subject/object, spells the death of nature. Human nature is its absence; its 
truth lies in its nothingness. It is through the ever intruding scientific gaze upon the mad 
that this truth is realized, however obliquely.  The modern human subject is established 
negatively, through insight into that which is other to it, thus positing an exterior that is 
distinct and separate from the interior. For Foucault’s 19th century, the mad inhabit the 
space that is this exterior, exterior to human nature, a revocation of humanity. However, 
awareness of the madman’s experience as yet another form of human experience, and 
“normal” human experience as established in relation to the madman/other, leads to the 
realization that there is no inherent or essential difference between the madman and the 
normal modern subject. They are established as distinct entities only in relation to one 
another. Ironically, it is the scientific psychologisation of the mad, alongside the pursuit 
of wisdom in the theoretical/Socratic philosopher (namely, Foucault), which reveal the 
lack of scientific ground upon which the entire construct stands. Madness, unlike mental 
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illness, is exposed as no more than a social edifice, without any scientific foundation.
31
 
Perhaps it is the case that madness will close in upon itself as the destruction of its truth 
becomes evident. In other words, the experience of madness and the enormity of self-
alienation which it breeds might one day vanish from the collective experience. 
In the first appendix to The History of Madness, that is, “Madness, the Absence of 
an Oeuvre,” Foucault exposes his own hopefulness for this more idealistic future. He 
imagines the West’s posterity inquisitively studying The Modern Age’s human 
experience: “What, they will wonder, was that strange delimitation that was in force from 
the early middle ages until the twentieth century, and perhaps beyond? Why did Western 
culture expel to its extremities the very thing in which it might just have equally 
recognized itself…?” (Foucault 542). For the first time in all of History of Madness 
Foucault writes speculatively on the future, a future in which the normal do not expel the 
outlier. Foucault is reaching for a future in which the individual recognizes his/herself as 
that which is other to oneself and embraces this fact. Why expel the extremity, and hence 
oneself (now destined for self-alienation), especially if a negative definition of oneself (in 
relation to the other) is the necessary mode in which one’s modern subjective experience 
is established? In short, why marginalize that which constitutes the self? 
Foucault opens the appendix with the idealistic hope that “One day, perhaps, we 
will no longer know what madness was. Its forms will have closed up on itself” (541). It 
is important to make note of “perhaps” in the above quotation. There is no certainty of 
                                                          
31
 “Mental illness and madness—two different configurations, which came together and became confused 
from the seventeenth century onwards, and which are now moving apart before our eyes, or rather inside 
our language” (544). Mental illness is a scientific and physiological construct. Madness, an experience of a 
particular category of people and their language implied both “psychiatric knowledge and a kind of 
anthropological reflection” (544). Foucault hints that Freud’s psychoanalysis at the end of the 19
th
 century 
may have been the end of the psychologisation of the subject. Freud worked on madness. Modern 
psychology works on mental illness.  
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such a future, for even if madness is removed from the experience of future generations, 
the underlying societal structure upon which it rested might remain. Foucault believes 
that it is possible for future, as yet unknown, technological advancements in medicine to 
wipe mental illness from the face of society. However, this does not mean that the 
modern person’s relationship to madness (in the abstract) will change: 
 
…that medical progress might one day cause mental illness to disappear, 
like leprosy and tuberculosis; but that one thing will remain, which is the 
relationship between man and his fantasies, his impossible, his non-
corporeal pain, his carcass of the night…that that which is most 
precarious, far more than the constancies of the pathological, is in fact 
unalterable: the relationship of a culture to the very thing that it excludes, 
and more precisely the relationship between our own culture and that truth 
about itself which, distant and inverted, it uncovers and covers up in 
madness. (542-543) 
 
Though pathological behavior and mental illness could one day be “cured” by medicine, 
the underlying relationship between modern culture and that which it excludes may 
remain. In fact, in the deathly, future silence in which madness is not confined, but rather 
completely destroyed/cured, what hope remains for a society seeking its own truth? If the 
other has been so far condemned as to exist only in abstraction, where will society turn to 
listen to its own truth? Where is one left to look for reconciliation and 
acceptance/affirmation of one’s self-alienation? 
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 These sorts of questions might lead one to an understanding of why Foucault 
focuses so heavily on the discourse on madness in the 19
th
 century. This discourse opened 
up the language of madness, a language that had been silenced during the Great 
Confinement of the Classical Age. It is only in the language of madness that society can 
listen to its outliers and hence see itself reflected. Therefore it is important to study the 
proliferation of this discourse, as well as the moment of its greatest abundance, before 
medicine becomes so rigorous as to forever silence the madness of the mentally ill. 
Society is constituted in relation to the mad and can only know its own truth in relation to 
the truth of the mad. Studying the language of madness is, then, studying the truth of the 
modern human subject. Greater knowledge of one’s own subjective experience lessens 
the burden of alienation and allows one a greater ability/propensity to roam the depths of 
one’s own subjectivity. It is therefore the case that the language of madness holds the key 
to a greater subjective experience. One must then embrace madness, embrace the 
discourse on madness, and engage in the proliferation of this discourse. If such an 
undertaking is not pursued, then the window that opened with 19
th
 psychologisation and 
psychoanalysis will slowly close as technological advances in medicine cure mental 
illness.   
 If one seeks to undertake a greater/richer subjective experience in the 21
st
 century, 
in the waning light of madness, then certain prescriptive questions arise; how does one 
engage in the discourse on madness? How does one use this language to better express 
one’s own subjective experience? I posit that an engagement with art/artistic creation, as 
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it relates to the infinity of becoming, is one possible mode of proliferating the discourse, 
and hence a path towards greater subjective experience.
32
  
The final pages of “The Anthropological Circle” briefly explore the relationship 
between madness and the artist’s body of work, or oeuvre. To spare future confusion, it is 
important to note that there is no necessary connection between madness and the oeuvre. 
A prolific body of work and artistic creation can exist quite independently of madness. 
The relationship between madness and the oeuvre is not one in which they coincide, but 
one of a qualitative nature at the limit of the oeuvre before the plunge into madness. In 
fact, absolute madness is opposed to the oeuvre, exposing its “outer limit” (536). 
Foucault writes, “Madness is an absolute rupture of the oeuvre: it is the constitutive 
moment of an abolition, which founds the truth of the oeuvre in time; it delineates the 
outer limit, the line of its collapse” (536). The oeuvre with which one must engage is not 
strictly the oeuvre of the mad, as no such oeuvre exists, but rather the oeuvre of the one 
on the verge of madness, the immanently mad. The oeuvre may “explode into madness” 
but is never contemporaneous with it. Foucault consistently sites three prolific, mentally 
ill artists in order to make his point: Friedrich Nietzsche, Vincent Van Gogh, and Antonin 
Artaud. Each of these artists had a mental illness, produced a rich oeuvre, and had his 
life/work cut short by the tragedy of his madness. 
When one looks at the oeuvre of any of these three exemplars, or one of an 
innumerable host of others, one must inquire into the truth of this oeuvre, i.e., whether or 
not it reflects anything about the “nature” of the modern subjective experience. Foucault 
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 This is not a claim that Foucault makes or endorses anywhere in History of Madness. This is, however, a 
possible prescription, and its origin may not have been possible without my engagement with this specific 
text. This thesis is evidence of its own claim. My awareness of a particular mode of becoming is only 
accessible through an engagement with Foucault’s artwork, History of Madness. 
64 
 
takes this task upon himself, writing on the truth of the oeuvre in question: “was it 
madness or art? Inspiration or fantasy? The spontaneous chattering of words, or the pure 
origin of a language?” (535). The oeuvre, occurring at its limits, before the abyss of 
madness, rests at a precarious position between the inspired genius of the artwork, and 
the fantastical, empty babble of the mad. Is Nietzsche’s body of work the prophetic ring 
of an insight only experienced as an exterior, or is it the nonsensical, hyperbolic poetry of 
the insane? The oeuvre critiqued at the interstice between inspiration and fantasy opens 
upon itself a question of truth. Madness’s total opposition to the oeuvre is that which 
establishes the oeuvre, and gives it its truth. “Where there is an oeuvre, there is no 
madness: and yet madness is contemporaneous with the oeuvre, as it is the harbinger of 
the time of its truth” (537). The truth of the oeuvre is established by a limit, a relationship 
to that which it is not, namely madness. This follows the same structure as that of the 
identity of the modern subject in his/her relation to madness. In both cases madness 
represents the extremity, the limit. If one crosses over into madness, then one delves into 
a void, losing the oeuvre, losing oneself.  
However, this “limit” implies a moment at which madness and the oeuvre 
converge.  For an instant madness and the oeuvre meet if only in order to delineate the 
point at which they expel the other, thus revealing their opposition and interdependence. 
In order for the oeuvre, that is, the artistic body, to be given meaning, it must be 
established against the endless void of the meaningless. Meaning, then, definite and 
concrete, can only be realized in its opposition to the indefinite and endless. The meaning 
of an artwork, its reflection and objectification of the subjective experience, is only a 
reality through its relationship to the meaninglessness that it borders. This is precisely 
65 
 
why inspiration and fantasy are simultaneously in close proximity and mutually 
exclusive. In order for a work to be inspired it must be posited against that which is 
fantastical. The inspiration and definitive greatness of an oeuvre reveals itself in the 
infinite. The coincidence of Nietzsche’s oeuvre and life portray an excess of meaning 
against the void of meaninglessness, e.g., the richness of The Will To Power against the 
hollow silence of Nietzsche’s subsequent breakdown.  
What does this mean for our project of subjective experience in the modern age? 
How might the coincidence of meaning and meaninglessness, as it is expressed in the 
artwork, work toward a broader, more “liberated” modern subject?  
If it is the case that meaning is established against the meaningless, then it would 
also seem to be the case that meaning is endlessly flexible. In other words, meaning is 
opened to its own plurality in its establishment as meaning (itself) against the 
meaningless, i.e., the infinite. The origin of meaning is in its absence. Thusly, the 
particular meaning with which one is constituted is arbitrary and meaningless. There is no 
truth to self-identity except that truth which one attributes to oneself against the 
nothingness of infinity. In other words, the interstice of madness and the oeuvre, as a 
boundary between meaning and the meaningless, reveals the choice that establishes 
meaning. There is nothing upon which meaning is founded except for meaninglessness. 
How then does meaning establish itself in the particular form it takes? There is no 
precedent for any specific form in the meaningless. Meaning therefore seems to arise out 
of the blue, a big bang, a point of light against an infinite darkness. Meaning, with no 
precedent, can be the result of nothing other than will, faced with the void, the 
nothingness that is our anti-natural nature. The will, with an unhindered, uncaused 
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movement, creates meaning against a negative backdrop. The will, in an unfathomable 
act, creates something from nothing. 
This, at minimum, establishes two facts: firstly, that something is established in 
opposition to nothingness, and thereby holds no truth at its foundation. This was observed 
above in relation to the modern subjective experience and will not be revisited at any 
length. Secondly, the essence of human existence is creative. If the human being has an 
anti-natural nature, i.e., is void of nature, embodied nothingness, then it must of necessity 
create nature for itself. In order to be, the human being must create, and thusly is of 
necessity an inventive, meaningful, artistic/aesthetic being. At the base of every word, 
scientific principle, and ego lies an artistic moment of creation, propelled to movement 
by will, without cause or meaning. There is no meaning to meaning, no great teleology to 
which our knowledge lays claim. There is only the decision, or rather, the impulse, 
toward self-creation. It is this impulse, and the ability to reconstitute oneself through 
strength of will, that acts as the instant of human becoming.  
Meaning, truth, and self-identity are all established in relation to the void that is 
madness. They exist because they reject nothingness. Since it is the case that the oeuvre 
functions in the same manner, i.e., as a rejection of madness, one might be able to sense 
an important way in which the meaning of the oeuvre relates to the formation of truth, 
self-identity, etc.  
The oeuvre, by its very nature as that which is other to madness, is meaningful, 
i.e., an object infused with meaning/truth. As an object infused with meaning, and also as 
the expression of an aesthetic experience, the artwork holds a special place in the 
discovery of new subjective terrain. It is the artwork, perhaps amongst other things, that 
67 
 
permits one to reanalyze and reconstitute one’s subjective experience. With a critical 
engagement towards that which embodies human subjective experience, one can acquire 
a more insightful understanding into the possibilities of that subjective experience. We 
will return to this point, but first we must note why the artwork and oeuvre are closer to 
our subjective reality than anything else, and hence why they are useful for this project.  
The artwork has often been purposeless, without function or use, but 
simultaneously infused with meaning. This is especially true of The Modern Age in 
which many of the traditional roles undertaken by the artwork have been 
usurped/supplanted due to a technological innovations and/or ideological alterations. This 
grants the oeuvre an odd place in the social sphere, one that invests within it a high 
degree of meaning without making it useful. There is no necessary objective to the 
artwork, no reason for its existence, no political or tangible purpose that could not be 
undertaken by some other class of object. This makes the oeuvre especially troublesome. 
What reason can be given to an excess of artistic work?  This superfluous nature of the 
artwork could reflect the excess of subjective experience, an excess that itself reflects the 
endless chattering of madness at its outer limit. The artwork’s tie to madness, then, is in 
its excessiveness. The artwork is granted meaning, but this is the excess of meaning. The 
oeuvre is meaningful in a way that natural objects are not: the oeuvre is the creation of 
the human being in the richest of forms. If, as we have stated above, it is true that the 
“essence” of the human being is creativity via will, and that creativity comes in the 
establishment of meaning, then the artwork is bound with a meaningfulness that gives it a 
close relationship to the “essence” of humanity. The relationship between the artwork and 
an existential truth of the human condition is inseparable. There is, of necessity, an 
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excess. The outpouring of robust subjectivity is captured in the moment of artistic 
creation, and that moment, beyond necessity, is fundamental.
33
 
A particular experience with art could be an experience that is absolutely essential 
to human nature, but such a claim would be in opposition to Foucault’s work, which 
implies an emptiness where “nature” ought to reside. If such a claim were to be made, 
then it would have to radically redefine art, i.e., make art inclusive of all creative 
endeavors. Since all that is meaningful for the human being is the result of a necessarily 
creative will, redefining art as such would open it up to an endless plurality, causing the 
definition to collapse in upon itself. If everything is art, then art loses its meaning, and 
ergo nothing is art.
34
 Art in the Modern Age must be infused with meaning, even if that is 
of its meaninglessness. Such a reconceptualization of subjective experience in its 
coincidence with an absolutely aesthetic experience does not suffice as a prescriptive 
answer for the modern human subject. Aesthetic experience cannot be absolute because 
the modern subject is necessarily also an object, the object of one’s own scientific gaze. 
Once more, subjectivity as absolutely aesthetic paradoxically makes everything 
meaningless through the complete extension of meaning.
35
 The modern subject must 
restrain meaning in order to maintain meaning, and therefor he/she must objectify art as a 
concrete definition with boundaries/limitations.  
                                                          
33
 It should be noted here that artistic creation itself is not fundamental for the expression of each 
individual subject. There simply must be art, or at the least, an aesthetic experience of the world, with 
which one can engage with one’s subjectivity. One could also open up the concept of “artistic creation.” A 
deeply aesthetic experience is itself creative, though it might not directly involve painterly, literary, or 
musical talents. 
34
 This is not necessarily a re-conception that ought to be discouraged, as it would limit the alienation one 
feels from the rest of the world. In fact, one might feel a greater connectivity with the world since it is the 
meaningful object of one’s creation. Since one is created by that which one isn’t, and one creates the 
outer world, the dialectic between the interior and exterior will collapse, resulting in a unity. This unity 
might breed an experience that frees one from alienation.  
35
 This follows a structure that parallels the objectification of liberty, elaborated upon in chapter one.  
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However, it is also not the case that one ought to abandon aesthetic experience 
altogether in favor of the scientific/theoretical approach. The objectifying forces of 
science and reason limit the subjective experience in an entirely different manner. While 
the absolutely aesthetic experience caves in upon itself in its excess, creating 
meaninglessness, the objective/scientific experience hones itself in on a particular, 
without regard for excess. The scientific experience seeks to establish and understand 
meaning, i.e., learn the “truth.” Thusly, the scientific mode, in its objectivity, suffocates 
creativity, that is, it smothers that which makes meaning. In restraining that which makes 
meaning in its pursuit of meaning/truth, it undermines its own goal and cuts itself off 
from any establishment of new meaning. There is only the possibility of opposition to the 
paradigm once the paradigm has recognized its own end in its other. This occurred, 
according to Foucault, in the window of 19
th
 century psychologisation.  The scientific 
experience only sees the truth of the object as that which is lacking.  
The modern experience is that of the subject/object. In their dialectic and 
necessary interplay they reveal themselves in the other, preventing the absolutism of 
either. Therefore there should be no call for a total re-conceptualization of subjectivity; 
accordingly, Foucault does not offer one. However, awareness of one’s position as 
subject/object can amount to a new, active engagement with that experience of alienation. 
How exactly such an engagement would manifest itself can be speculated upon using the 
revelation of humanity’s anti-natural nature, as it was exposed by the language of 
madness. This revelation is itself historically contingent and can therefore apply only to 
subjects who are subjects of that historical moment, i.e., the Modern Age. 
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Since it is the creativity of the will, which manifests itself out of humanity’s 
essential nothingness, i.e., the anti-natural nature, it is the aesthetic experience that 
precedes the scientific.  The will must predate the truth because it is the will that invents 
the truth. There is no truth until the will wills it into existence. This creative, anti-
essentialist origin of truth exposes a moment that precedes objective/scientific thinking, 
precedes even causality. It exposes the unreason at the heart of human existence and it is 
only against this void that objectivity can constitute itself. The void does not constitute 
itself against the truth; the void is the original position. In other terms, the meaningless 
exists before meaning. There is nothing meaningful before the rise of the human intellect. 
It is only once meaning is ascribed to the meaningless from which it was birthed that 
objective/scientific experience ensues. The founding abyss, the creative impulse, is a 
reflection of the aesthetic experience, and it is this experience that must manifest itself in 
a foundational capacity. It must be recalled as the basis for the specific experience of the 
modern subject/object. 
 Thusly it must be acknowledged that the aesthetic experience informs our 
scientific/objective pursuits. More importantly, it must also be recalled in the arts, a 
domain that can be more fully separated from objectivist tendencies.  Art is not of 
necessity infused with a vigorous aesthetic experience, but it is the domain in which this 
experience is most robust and frequent. Art is therefore the place one ought to most 
commonly look to for the aesthetic experience. However, as was noted above, 
objective/scientific experience can, and will, limit the truth of an object or concept. If 
objectivity seeps its fingers into an artistic domain, then it has the ability to stifle the 
aesthetic experience as it pertains to art. The aesthetic experience, as that which gives rise 
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to objectivity through its creative force, could be silenced by its own child. This would 
thereby severally limit both scientific and objective experience, making the human 
experience frighteningly more limited. It then becomes necessary to keep said objectivity 
away from the artwork and the artwork safe from the dictatorship of reason. The oeuvre 
needs a space apart from scientific observation, or at the least, one in which aesthetic 
experience is the primary reaction, not a need for truth. This is a possible step toward a 
more robust modern subject. 
Aesthetic experience, in its primacy over objectivity (especially within the 
domain of art), puts the truth at a distance from the physical, sensational, 
phenomenological experience of the artwork in itself. It allows for a plurality of 
responses to an artwork. These responses are not judged on “correctness” but rather their 
reality; thusly the embracement of the aesthetic sensation is the affirmation of the lived 
subjective experience. The interaction with the artwork is lived through the aesthetic 
sensation rather than understood through a scientific distance. At least such is the case at 
the most basic level. 
The oeuvre’s separation from dominating, primary objectivity opens the 
possibility for a greater understanding of one’s modern subjectivity. Before any objective 
or critical insight into the artwork, one must first embrace the sensation that occurs 
concurrently with the physical interaction with said artwork. The awareness and openness 
to sensation allows for a more intuitive interaction with the artwork. Intuition can then 
subsequently interact with the scientific/theoretical faculty of reason in order to establish 
a more objective meaning. It should be noted, however, that the objectivity of the artwork 
has its basis on that which is subjective, i.e., the subject’s intuition/sensation, that is, a 
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creation of the will. “The strength and power of the sense—this is the essential thing in a 
well-constituted and complete man: the splendid ‘animal’ must be given first—what 
could any ‘humanization’ matter otherwise!” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 538). The 
more “human” matter to which Nietzsche alludes is one that creates truth, an objective 
matter of reason. This can never come to fruition if the “animal” and sensational are not 
well-formed. Therefore, if one’s goal is to see the Enlightenment project through to its 
darkest end, it is firstly necessary to live, to experience the sensation before one 
objectifies.
36
 
If objectification/interpretation seeks to predate the aesthetic sensation not only 
will it fail, but more importantly it will mask that which is must fundamental to the 
subjective engagement with artwork, that is, the sensation. The sensation, and therefore 
the aesthetic experience, must be liberated from the oppression of objectivity. If art is 
infused with objective purpose, then it has the potential to hide the subjective experience 
art is capable of revealing. This thereby hides one even further from oneself. The 
possibility of being other is crushed in a pseudo-confinement of subjectivity. If 
subjectivity is hidden in that which has the most direct potential as an expression of 
subjectivity, i.e., the artwork, then the human experience is thusly diminished. 
If this is the case, and we assume (not without some danger) that a heightening of 
human experience is to be highly valued, then art must be liberated from its infusion with 
objectivity, purpose, meaning, function, etc. Art must function as the functionless, i.e., it 
should be treated as autonomous. It is only by allowing art to constitute its own meaning 
                                                          
36
 This might reflect the way in which, according to Foucault, the 19
th
 century experience of madness was 
expressed with greater passion and neutrality than it had been in previous centuries. The concurrence of 
investment and disinterest parallels the heightening of subjective experience with the attainment of 
greater objectivity. 
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that it has the potential to engage critically with the aesthetic experience and thereby our 
modern subjectivity. The aesthetic sensation must be affirmed as that which is 
good/desirable in and of itself. This would therefore create a play between an 
autonomous subjectivity and an autonomous artwork. Together they have the potential to 
heighten the meaning/experience of the other in a positively dialectical relationship. This 
autonomy coincides with a liberation that allows for the possibility of consistent self-
reconstitution and a general playfulness with one’s world. This autonomy is the reflection 
of the strongest and freest of wills. The theoretical/intellectual emerges from the 
autonomous will as a superfluity, albeit an incredible one: 
 
The free intellect copies human life, but it considers this life to be 
something good and seems to be quite satisfied with it. That immense 
framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his 
whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding 
and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it 
smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it 
back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and 
separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these 
makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather 
than by concepts. (“On Truth and Lies in the Non-moral Sense” 122) 
 
Nietzsche’s “free intellect” does not seek to establish itself as something in opposition to 
the form of “human life” but rather accepts itself as a copy. It does not condemn the 
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other, its own anti-natural nature, to madness. It does not seek to nullify the void from 
which it arose. On the contrary. The free intellect sees itself as that which is without 
framework or restriction. It arose from the meaningless and can now constitute meaning 
however it may see fit. In “smashing the framework” and “pairing the alien” the intellect 
opens to an objective plurality, perhaps infinitely.  
In this continuous readjustment of meaning and pluralism of objectivity, the 
modern subject/object finds him/herself with a more robust subjectivity, thereby, 
however so slightly, easing the pain of self-alienation. In an anonymous interview,
37
 
Foucault expresses his hope for the future of artistic engagement: “I can’t help but dream 
about a kind of criticism that would not try to judge, but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a 
sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and 
catch the sea-foam in the breeze and scatter it” (Foucault 326). Perhaps it is the case that 
such an engagement with the purest creation of human subjectivity, that is, the artwork, 
has the potential to “light fires.” The light of the raging flame grows infinitely. As a 
wildfire, untamed, it envelops more within itself, positing less as its other. The fire grows 
with the oeuvre, affirming its fundamental nothingness in creativity and affirming its 
historical specificity in a playful engagement with itself.  
 
 
                                                          
37
 One should note that Foucault’s decision to be interviewed anonymously on such a topic corresponds 
nicely with the idea that art should remain autonomous. When one reads an interview with “Foucault,” or 
any other known author/thinker, it is infused with a particular, inescapable meaning. This is not the case 
when an interview is with “Anonymous.” The anonymity of the interview allows for the ideas to speak on 
their own terms, outside of the influence of Foucault’s prestige. One’s interaction with the interview one 
is reading is then heightened by the influence of one’s own subjective experience. It can be read in a 
multitude of ways in which Foucault is not normally read and could acquire a plurality of meanings that 
are contradictory the life of Foucault.  
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